A death duel before the Red Army.

The Guangchang Defence War was the most typical of positions in the history of the Red Army, where the Red Army suffered heavy casualties. During the 18 days of fighting, the Red Army killed and captured more than 2,600 people, with more than 5,000 casualties in its own right. The defeat of this campaign accelerated the Central CCP research and implementation of the strategic transfer plan in the Central Sudan region.

Guangchang's battle began as a gatekeeper.

During the fifth “closure” of the Central Sou district, the National Party pursued a strategy of siege in the north-west and south-west, focusing its efforts on the North and East Road Forces. For the Central Suu district, the northern gate is broad, the southern gate is concubine, the eastern gate is dragon rock and the western gate is in the Xing State and Lungkang. At that time, the National Party concentrated half a million troops on the central Soviet zone, focusing not on a little breakthrough, but on a split advance, with a focus on the north. On 10 April 1934, prior to the outbreak of the Guangchang campaign, the National Party (NP) had demarcated the area on the northern side of the land to the region of Guangchang, so that when the Guangchang campaign broke out, the Central Soviet District was already in a very dangerous situation. From September 1933 to April 1934, the PNP army gradually advanced with bunker tactics, largely occupying the outer regions of Guangchang. Without such defence, and in accordance with the opening of the ground portal, it is highly likely that he will be attacked within a month. It must be a bloodbath. Through the first six months of fighting, the National Party has occupied the northern part of the country beyond Guangchang, at which point only the gate can be kept.

On 28 September 1933, three divisions of the Third Road Army of the Nationalist Party (NP) under Chen Chen's command occupied Lechuan, on 13 October, the nitro, at the end of October, and at the end of November, Shunhashi, Da Yugum, Shinjiang, and the party entrance. In the face of the advance of the enemy, the Red Army did not fail to attempt a campaign, but had also sent some troops to disguise itself against the National Party army in an attempt to lure its independent forces out and then to use the time gap to implement tactics such as siege. However, the Nationalist Party, which had suffered the losses of the first four anti-war operations, resorted to fortlifting tactics in the course of the operation, with little distance of more than a few kilometres per day, making it difficult for the Red Army to create a favourable warplane. On 10 April 1934, when the National Party arrived in Guangchang, it had largely removed the barrier from outside Guangchang County. As a result, Guangchang has become a truly northern gate in the Central Sudan region, and its outlying areas have become isolated and difficult for troops to break out. At that time, the National Party ' s Northern Road Force had built forts in the north-up south, west to Lian, west to yellow, south to south to south to south, east to east, to east. The eastern road forces occupied Sa territory, Lian, Tanin, and naturalized, leaving only Jingin in April. The eastern gate and the western gate and the southern gate were largely surrounded by the enemy, who concentrated on the northern gate of Guangchang. In the face of the daunting challenge of “under the siege”, the battle of Guangchang has been a battle of gatekeepers from the beginning.

The battles of Guangchang show the spirit of the Red Army's fearless revolution.

Despite the fact that the Guangchang campaign did not serve its strategic purpose, neither did it wipe out the enemy in large numbers, nor did it end up in Guangchang district, the spirit of sacrifice and the noble beliefs of the Communists demonstrated by the Red Army soldiers in the Guangchang campaign are a permanent record. General Zhang Zhang Zhang, who was a personal defender and later Vice-President of the Central Military Commission, recalled: “I have been a soldier for my entire life and fought for my entire life, and no war has been as fierce and cruel as the Great Defence War in my military career. Our soldiers are so brave and fearless." The spirit of the Red Army in the Guangchang campaign is reflected in the following:

A sense of mission to protect the northern gate of Central Suu district. Guangchang is an important barrier in the north of the Central Sud district. If Guangchang fails, the overall security of the Central Sudan region will face a more serious threat. Guangchang's defence lasted 18 days, almost daily. The total strength of the Red Army is around 40,000, with 11 divisions totalling more than 100,000. In contrast to the power of such disparities, the enemy has to pay a great price every step forward, which in itself is an expression of the bravery and tenacity of the Red Army. It is conceivable that the National Party would have moved faster without these 18 days of blood. Mountain traffic is particularly difficult, not to mention the brutal fighting and even the many times it has been fought. The strong faith and sacrifice shown by the Red Army soldiers in the face of their weakness and critical situation are the historical values of this battle that should always be remembered.

Proactive and undefeating revolutionary optimism. From September 1933, the fifth anti-war siege, to April of the following year, half a year has passed since the guerrilla and sporting wars we used to use in the past became ineffective. At this point, only the northern gate of Guangchang, whether the party centre or the Red Army fighters, will be left behind. Even though some within the party disagreed with the tactics of the time, they were determined to implement the central instructions, which demonstrated the aggressive, unfailing revolutionary optimism of our revolutionary team led by the Communist Party and the highly partisan principle of submission to organizational decisions. The heavy fighting in the Guangchang campaign has inspired the followers to move forward with greater courage. The noble qualities of the soldiers and cadres who lost their lives in the battle of Guangchang will forever be written in the history of the Communist Party of China and the Chinese nation.

Look at Guangchang's battle from a historical perspective.

Looking at the broad battle from a historical perspective, it can be seen in at least three dimensions: first, it should be seen that the decision to make a strategic shift at the central level is in fact an expression of a self-revolutionary spirit. Our party's consistent pattern of error and frustration cannot be simply attributed to objective reasons but to subjective reasons. Our party has always stressed responsibility. As a major battle, the battle of Guangchang ended without victory and must be pursued. If there is a failure on a major issue, there must be a corresponding responsibility, a revolutionary spirit of self-reflection and responsibility.

Secondly, the significance of the broad defence war should be understood in terms of stabilizing the hearts and minds of the military, encouraging morale and seeking strategic initiative. The enemies of Guangchang's defence have assembled more than 100,000 troops, both in numbers and with more weapons than the Red Army. Against this background, the central Red Army has resolutely fought with its enemies in broad-scale combat, not only to stabilize the army's hearts and minds, but more so to gain the positive force of a few months of strategic passivity in which it has taken the initiative to inspire morale. Regina, the red capital at the time, was inevitably affected by the confidence and overall morale of the Sioux civil-military struggle in the face of the heavy fighting of the National Party and the opening of the Guangchang North Gate. At that time, 500,000 members of the National Army surrounded the north-west. At the same time, the centre has tried the tactics of "Safe Zhao from Wei". In July 1934, the centre sent the Red Seven to the north, but less than a few months later the Red Seven were defeated because of the need for a strong force in order to “feel and rescue Zhao”. At this time, the central Red Army dared to wage a death duel with its enemy, in Guangchang, and fully demonstrated the positive spirit of the revolution in which the Communist Party of China led the Red Army, which was optimistic and tenacious, and which had a significant positive effect on the faith of the civilian and military in a firm revolution victory.

Thirdly, the significance of the broad campaign is recognized in the context of the quest to create more opportunities for victory in war. Despite the failure of Guangchang, it was not an attempt to resist in the midst of a rapidly changing war situation and to find new warplanes in a dynamic war situation. If there is no active preparation at the outset, there is only one final outcome: The northern gate (Gang Chang) opened and the enemy drove straight into Red Durregin. It is this war that has proved to be the slow pace of the accelerated attack by the National Party on the Central Sudan region, the follow-up of the withdrawal of the main Red Army force, the implementation of a strategic shift with greater determination on the part of the central Government, and the creation of a favourable opportunity for the whole party and all forces to withdraw from the Central Sudan region. If, in the circumstances of the fifth pre-war battle against the siege, the centre decides to withdraw, then an inescapable question is: where can it be moved?

Are there any deficiencies in the Guangchang campaign? The answer is yes. The core problem lies in the fact that later the Red Army suffered too much, knowing that it cannot remain dead. But when is the best time for our troops to end their hard work, to maximize their preservation power, to effectively protect the security of the region, and to prepare the conditions for a major strategic shift for security? This will require careful study by both party and military history.

This is my understanding as a historical researcher. History cannot be assumed, but history research should think.

(by Professor, Maxist Institute of Beijing University, Co-Director of the National Centre for Research on Revolucionary Monuments, Beijing University-China Communist Party Revolutionary History Fair, Head and Chief Expert of the China-Maxian Development Research Base for Philosophy Social Science, Beijing)

Published in Beijing Daily, May 18, 2026, 12th edition, Theory Weekly, Manstory