China's National Security Concept Transition and Re-engineering in the Late Queens

Executive summary: China's traditional concept of national security, influenced by the idea of “underground” is characterized by a moral orientation based on Confucian ethics as a value, a popular ideology based on heavy agronomism, and a defensive sexual orientation based on “outside and above”. However, in the aftermath of the “long change of more than three thousand years” in the late-cleaning period, China's traditional national security outlook gradually broke the “underground” paradigm and began to shift to a modern-day concept of national security: a dramatic change in the external security environment, which led to a historical transition from a “warrant order” to “sovereign equality”; economic aggression by Western countries, which led to the evolution of the perception of Qing Government's economic sovereignty from “one-size-fits-all” to “right-to-interest”; and a clash between the former and the rigid border concepts of modern sovereign States, which led to the Qing Government's perception of border security gradually becoming a clear “sovereign border” from the vagueness of “a borderless”. The historical logic, ideas and practical experience inherent in the national security vision of late dawn provide us with a valuable historical perspective for the modernization of our national security system and capacity in today's “hundred-year-olds of great change”. Title Note: This is the results of a phased study of the National Social Science Fund's major project, “Study on the development of a security system for the `across the road'” (No. 22 VRC 169), the Jilin Province Social Science Fund's priority project, “Study on the critical mission of the Jilin province in the maintenance of the State's `five security'” (No. 2025A18), and the research project on the pedagogical reform of postgraduate education at Jilin University, “Study model of national security in the context of cross-cutting disciplines” (No. 2023JGZ019). Keywords: big change/ late clearance/ national security/ “underground”/

The author's summary: Shaw Qian, Dean of the Institute of Public Diplomacy of Jilin University, Director of the Institute for National Development and Security Studies, and distinguished Professor of “Quan Yamin Scholar”, mainly in the areas of Chinese foreign affairs and national security; and Jilin University School of Public Diplomacy, Master's degree, in the field of national security. Source: National Security Study (Kyoto), 2025, No. 6, pp. 18-39.

The idea of a “change” interpretation of the times is rooted in China's historical traditions and reflects deeply the Chinese traditional culture's sensitivity to key points in the evolution of history, creating an interpretational perspective that explains the country's resilience and institutional change: During the Qinhan era, China moved from a sub-seasonal system of “people-building” to a “big one” centralist empire, and the focus of national security was shifted from competition in the countries to internal governance, called “Gay Qin Han is a major change in the world”. From 1 to the period of Southern Song, the pattern of confrontation between Song Yuan made the military threat from the minority regime of the North the most direct challenge to national security, when it was termed “the razing of the North and the South and the changing of the ages”. Of these, the most far-reaching are the historical changes that face, especially in the light of the late settlement period. Since the opium war, the invasion of Western capitalist civilization has completely disrupted the development of civilization in the isolation of the “Taiwan State” and has dramatically impacted China's traditional economic model, political system and social fabric. Li Hongzhang called it “the 90 thousand miles between East and West of the Earth, where China is concentrated, and a major change in over 3,000 years”. Under the twin challenges of internal and external diplomacy, the national security concept of the late dawn has also undergone a historic transition from a traditional “underground” to a modern “sovereign” view based on national and international law systems, which has profoundly shaped the path to the modernization of China's national security system. The question that arises is, in the context of “a major change of more than three thousand years”, what are the shocks and challenges to China's national security vision in the late Qing era, and how can it be achieved from the traditional “underground” to the modern “sovereign” perspective? This issue is a key theme in the overall national security vision and in China's excellent traditional culture. The further modernization of the national security system and capacity in the context of the country is an important inspiration. I. Sources and main features of China ' s traditional national security approach

China's traditional concept of national security is rooted in the “underground” system of ideas that China's civilization has created in a relatively independent environment. The “underground view” reflects the ancient Chinese self-centred cognitive system, shapes the vagrancy pattern of the “centre-margin” structure, and emphasizes the need to maintain national security through moral calling and civilizationalization. In a long historical process, China ' s traditional national security vision has developed rich and unique ideological features, which together constitute the intrinsic logic of China ' s traditional national security vision and have profoundly influenced the security practices of successive dynasty, but also inevitably revealed its historical limitations in the recent conflict with the Western concept of sovereign security. (i) The origins of China ' s traditional concept of national security

For a long time, China's civilization has been bred and developed in a relatively independent geographical environment, building a self-centred cognitive system that encompasses the three levels of geospatial, psychological identity and ethical order, and resulting in a set of “underground views” that is consistent with world views and approaches. The formation and development of the “underground view” has permeated all of China's ancient history, not only shaping the unique quality of Chinese civilization and the international order in East Asia, but also having a profound impact on the construction of China's traditional national security vision. The expression “under the heavens, under the earth, under the earth, under the earth, under the land, under the land”, as it had been in the early Qin era, reflects the emergence of ideas that combine the concept of geospatial space and the political order. By the time of spring and autumn, Qi Xianjiang had set forth the political ideal of the Zhou Emperor as the Lord of the world; the concept of “prosperity over China, the rule of law” contained in the Logic of China revealed a pattern of the spread of intellectual civilization from its centre to its periphery. During wartime, the integration of geographical concepts such as “the Four Seas” in Kyushu has brought the concept of “underground” beyond the specific territorial and geographical scope and gradually evolved into a concept of a systematic political order. In this vision, “the sky” is a concentric structure: China is the centre of the civilization of “the world”, and it is “the sky above” others; and “the heavenly Son” represents the heavenly rule. On the periphery of the concentric circle are the surrounding minorities, who express their identity with the Chinese civilization through regular Guna and recognize China ' s political authority. In order to become an integral part of Chinese civilization, the surrounding peoples must undergo a profound transformation of Chinese culture, known as “diplomatic into China, then Chinese”. This set of ideas lays down the institutional and cultural foundation of the “underground” of China as an independent world system, not part of the outside world. Under the influence of the “underground view”, the Chinese former dynasty graded neighbouring countries in accordance with the degree of subservience and proximity to the centre of domination, creating a vagrancy pattern of the “centre-margin” structure and emphasizing moral appeal and civilizationalization as important means of maintaining its own security. On this basis, China's traditional national security view holds that the best security guarantee is not the conquest by force, but rather the “sheltering in”. According to the Left, “The ancients, the Sons of God, are in the shadows of the people, without fear or fear, and the country uses its cities”,8 which points out that security problems can naturally be solved as long as the country is able to practise the German religion within itself, so that foreign nations can be subjugated. Guided by this idea, successive dynastys have tended to gradually integrate the surrounding polities into the world order, with a central focus on Chinese civilization, through the civilizationalization of civilization, in a profound reflection of the perception and practice of China's traditional national security concept, which is influenced by the “underground view”. In the course of the subsequent historical process, successive dynastys, despite their focus on specific concepts of national security, have, in general, been at the heart of China's traditional national security vision, based on an “underground” order. By Qing Dynasty, as centralization and monarchy peaked, the national security system also improved. Through a series of initiatives, such as the pacification of San San Francisco, the recovery of Taiwan, the recruitment of Gahr, the establishment of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and General Ishihara, the Qinginging Government has created a vast multi-ethnic State, and on this basis has divided the world into a three-fold relationship: the “Face of the sky”, the neighbouring State, and the “expatriate states”. Under this concept, the Qingting considers Western countries to be razed, while business with Western countries is seen as a favour from “the sky towards the state” to razed. This idea is a profound reflection of the fundamental contradiction between the “underground security concept” of the Qing Dynasty and the “sovereign security concept” of Western countries based on Westphalia. (ii) Main features of China ' s traditional national security concept

China's traditional concept of national security has evolved into a rich and unique ideological identity, influenced by the idea of “the world”. These characteristics are derived from the geographical context and historical experience that characterize Chinese civilization and reflect deeply the systematic perception of security issues in ancient China. In short, its core features can be summarized in three ways: the moral colours of Confucian ethics as a value, the people's ideology based on a heavy agronomism, and the defensive tendencies “within and outside”, which together constitute the intrinsic logic of China's traditional national security vision. 1. Ethical colours guided by Confucian ethics as a value

China's traditional national security vision has a distinct moral and ethical orientation. As early as the spring and autumn, Mengko said, "Why do we have to do this?" It's just that there's more to it than there's more to it. Since then, as Confucianism has been established as the dominant ideology in the ideological field, its ethics have further shaped the value orientation of traditional national security concepts, and have evolved to form a national security vision with the characteristics of Chinese civilization, along the two core paths of “certification” and “naturalization”. The internal order of national security is shaped by “decency”. The ceremonialism is the core concept of the Confucian ethic, which aims at establishing a hierarchical order between human beings in which the members of society can take their place and perform their duties, thus achieving a harmonious and stable overall order. Tzuko suggested that “human life is in the hands of the heavens and the kingdom is in the hands of the law”, and whether or not to regulate is the key to China's traditional national security. It is natural for the country to be at peace if it is “rightly” and, conversely, if it is “ignoble and disobedient”, it is “honorless”. Thus, Meng's statement that “in order to serve as a king and as a rule, both of them can only do so in peace” (11) calls for the strengthening of their moral discipline and their internal upbringing in order to achieve lasting peace in the internal order of the country. (12)

The external environment of national security is maintained by “naturalization”. According to the Confucian ideology, the advanced nature of the Huasaka civilization is not only material, but also spiritual and cultural. The culture of comity has a strong spiritual appeal and inspiration for the surrounding peoples and constitutes a Confucian cultural circle centred on Chinese civilization. On that basis, it is possible to be “naturalized” into the world order, provided that the values at the core of the Confucian ideology are accepted. On this basis, China's traditional view of national security holds the view that, in the face of potential security threats from outside forces, national security should not be subjugated by force, but rather by the application of the far-fetched idea of the “mode of king” — that is, by using Confucianian morality as a criterion for the active naturalization of neighbouring countries — and that, naturally, national security is guaranteed. Confucius suggested that “from the farthest of the world, since Shuu Wend”, (13) emphasizing that people should be subjugated by cultural rather than military means. Monko Temwen, “The farthest man knows that Kings rule and wants to be taken for granted” (14), also emphasizes the appeal of “grateful government”. As long as the ruler is a German ruler, the desired effect of the “Sweeters Quartet, with fear in their hearts” (15) can be achieved by creating an external barrier to national security. 2. A people ' s ideology based on a strong agriculturalism

People's ideas are an important element of China's traditional national security concept. The expression “the people are only Bongmoto, Bongnin” in the Monk, (16) is fundamental to the people's rule of State and security. Mengko has since further developed this idea in a systematic manner, putting forward the view that “the people are the people, the society is the next best, the king is the light”, and (17) has established the people's priority in the political order in a series of values. Since then, with the establishment of the central system of Qinhan's “prefecture” and the development of the Confucian ideology, the hearts and minds of the people have been raised to the heart of the country's problems. The Story states that “the plague lies in the fall, not in the collapse”, and (18) considers the “fall” of the bottom population to be a greater national security risk than the “break” within the ruling bloc. With the dialectics of “the water of the canoe”, the Chinese people have further clarified the intrinsic link between the security of the people and that of the country, and have created a world of chastity. Since the Song Dynasty, with the growth of economic production and the emergence of civic society, the content of popular ideas has been further expanded and enriched, and the livelihoods of the rich and the poor are equally recognized as important determinants of national security. It states that “the people and the people are the same, the people are the blood of the nation, the nation is the skin of the people ... the people are rich, the people are poor, the people are poor, the people are secure and the people are trapped, and rightly so” and that “the people are in chaos because they are prosperous and the people are poor. Never heard of it since the heavens and the earth were born.” (19) This series of statements reflects deeply the continuity and development of popular ideas in China ' s traditional national security vision. Nevertheless, the people ' s philosophy inherent in China ' s traditional national security approach is completely different in nature from contemporary civil rights. The concept of “governance and love for the people”, which has been advocated for many years, has been drawn from the history of the dynasty, and its fundamental purpose remains to consolidate its feudal dictatorship. Since agricultural production, which is dominated by the small-scale farmers ' economy, is a major source of ancient dynasty fiscal revenue and labour, China ' s traditional national security outlook has shown a strong agriculturalist orientation. Most of the ideas that it promotes are based on agricultural production and are based on guaranteeing the economic stability of small farmers. At the same time, the dynamic elements of socio-economic activities, such as science and technology and commercial trade, which are considered by the rulers to be the main source of competition for agricultural labour resources, thereby undermining patriarchal social relations based on the agricultural economy, are often seen as potential risks to national security. As a result, the majority of rulers have pursued “hard-farming” economic policies and adopted institutional constraints on business activities, thereby maintaining the economic foundations of the traditional national security system. “Inside and out” defensive tendencies

China's traditional approach to national security is generally “inside and out” defensive. The formation of this characteristic is closely related to the geographical context in which Chinese civilization is located. The Central Chinese dynasty is geographically surrounded by the surrounding mountains, seas and deserts, creating a natural national security defence barrier, known as “the sea, the sand of the west, the deserts of the north and the mountains of the south, which limits the day to the distance and the distance”. (20) This geo-environment gap further reinforces the pattern of evaporation in the “underground” view, creating a dual perception of “the country in the spring and autumn, and the summer and summer razing”. The rule logic of the dynasty has generally been based on the logic of governance, which “does not contain the trees, does not contain them, does not contain them”: (21) considers that “the people of China are the people of the world, and the people of the world are the same”, and (22) focuses on internal governance, with a negative attitude towards external security issues. For example, Li Qin warns that “there is nothing to worry about, nothing to prevent, nothing to rape, and nothing to fear if it is internal. In this context, the traditional vision of national security has shown a marked introvert and defensive orientation, advocating for “a territorial stand-alone and no distant future”. (24) In the face of Han Wudy's development in the West, Semaji criticized it as “a luxurious and plethora of punishments, internal palaces, and foreign affairs ... so that nothing is different from the Qin Emperor”. (25) Ming Dynasty Zhu Yuan Dynasty, moreover, explicitly demanded, in its His Majesty's Order, that Ming Dynasty must not use force against its surroundings. “The Quartet is far away... I fear the future generations, relying on China's wealth, greed for a time of war, unprovoked fighting, killing people, and remembering them all.” (26) Even to this end, I have outlined “no razing the name of the nation” and institutionalize a defensive security strategy. In conclusion, the defensive strategy of “within and outside” has partly preserved China’s ancient feudal dynasty, but the overemphasis on internal stability has also made China’s ancient national security vision conservative, and has tended to follow tradition and impatience in the face of serious threats by adopting passive defensive strategies. By the end of the Chong Dynasty, even though some of the enlightened doctors have recognized the technical advantages of the Western countries' “boats” – the dominant thinking still holds the hope that the threat will be resolved by “the way the Holy King rules”. This negative and conservative strategic tendency has inevitably led to a passive beating in China ' s response to major recent changes. II. The transformation process of China ' s national security vision in the late-cleaning period

Since the opium war, modern inputs from Western countries have had a dramatic impact on China ' s traditional political system and state patterns. The traditional concept of national security, with its “underground” at its core, is undergoing a profound transformation in the face of “no major change in the millennium”, in three main areas: First, the dramatic changes in the external security environment have led to a historical shift in diplomacy from a “warrant order” to “sovereign equality” and to a shift in national security strategies from traditional moral narratives to pragmatic interests among sovereign States. Second, the economic aggression of Western countries has led to an evolution in the perception of Qing Government's economic sovereignty, from “one-size-fits-all” to “right-to-interest”, and has led to the evolution of its economic outlook from a simple “business war” strategy to a repossession movement centred on tariff and industrial sovereignty. Thirdly, the pre-modern border concept, which collided with the rigid border concept of a modern sovereign State, has led to the gradual consolidation of the border security concept of the clean government from the vague state of “a borderless” to a clear “sovereign border” and has facilitated the transformation of the border governance concept from “within and outside” to “within and outside”. These three aspects, which are interlinked and mutually reinforcing, have contributed to the historical transformation and restructuring of China ' s traditional national security vision in the late Qingy period. (i) Historical transition from “warrant order” to “sovereign equality”: the concept of diplomacy

Diplomacy is an important means of preserving and shaping national security. China's traditional concept of national security is based on a “underground” order, and its specific security strategy relies on a moral appeal and Huairou approach guided by Confucian ethics as a value, with a view to achieving the desired external security environment of the “wanbong-dynasty”. During the opium war, the Emperor of Hong Kong decreed: “The Emperor is in charge of the Emperor, and there is no discrimination in the thin sea or beyond. Those who come to China to trade with the outside world have a slight grievance and are immediately punished.” (27) Even during the Second Opium War, the Emperor fantasizes that the British and the French countries would be automatically naturalized by the Huairou means of “justifiably enlightening, moralally rejecting” them and allowing them to adapt to one or two of their terms and order in order to restrain them” (28). However, the Western powers faced by the late Qing government are fundamentally different from the “generic barbarism” recognized by the traditional “underworld”. In China ' s history, although there have been precedents for ethnic minorities entering China by virtue of their superiority in military power, these regimes are often in a weak position at the institutional and cultural level, eventually subjugated by the regime of the former Chinese dynasty or integrated into a more mature Wahsha civilization. However, in the context of the rapid development of the industrial revolution and modern capitalism in the mid-19th century, and in the face of the dominant Western powers in terms of material conditions, technological level and political system, the Qing Dynasty was unable to win by force or to subjugate it to the underworld by the graceful means, with the result that the traditional diplomatic concept of “the faraways fall to the Quartet, the fear of the world.” The incursions by the Western powers and the dramatic changes in the external security environment have led a group of enlightened doctors to become aware of the special and severe nature of the national security threats facing the Qing Dynasty at the time. Among other things, the Qingling literaryist Huang Ji-ju said “The change”: “I don't know what the foreigners are, nor what English and French are. From the north-west China Sea to the south-east, it is the north-west China, the south-east China, and the south-central China, the south-central China, and the south of China. (29) The pioneers of the world, Seo Ji-hyun, put it: “The islands of the South China Ocean, the reeds, the five Indias near Tibet, and the future of Han, where they were weak, were weak, became Europa, and now become Europa heads. (30) Chong Chong Chong Dynasty, the first foreign minister, Guo Qian, went on to add that: “There is no such thing as a treachery.” (31) Despite differences in starting points, the understanding of “changes” in the late-cleaning period has become the consensus of the group of enlightened doctors: the “changes” in Central-West relations have gone beyond the traditional “summer resolution” and represent a fundamental challenge to the entire system. In this shift of perception, the most groundbreaking point of view is that of Wang Qing: “The ocean has been used as a gateway for all nations since the conclusion of the treaty with the States of Texy, and the ship has been able to travel throughout the Earth for 100 days, so that there is little movement in and out of the world, with China, but with the likeness of spring and autumn.” (32) Through the historical analogy of the Spring and Autumn countries, the Western countries have been identified as political entities equivalent to the Chinese civilization, and the initial ideological and intellectual transformation has been made from a “underground” order to a diplomatic concept of equality of sovereign States. This shift in attitude has been reflected in the evolution of diplomatic ceremonialism during the evening. Prior to the opium war, China had long adopted the relations between the two Koreas as a normative requirement for diplomatic protocol. In 1656, the Governor of Badavia, the Netherlands, sent a visitor to China, who was asked to perform a bow and bow and promised “one visit for eight years”. (33) In 1793, the British sent the Magalny Mission to China, which was received by the Qingting as a “Messenger of the Qingo Lamagon” and was eventually dispersed by a dispute over the need to bow down. In the traditional perception of the “underground” of protocol, not only as a formal procedural arrangement, but also as a central symbol of State authority and civil order, its ethical importance transcends even the considerations of real national interests. For example, during the negotiation of the Nanjing Treaty, the Qing Government agreed to the opening of five lines of commerce, etc., but in its formulation, it used the words “the Emperor's grace to the British people to bring their families to Guangzhou, Fuzhou, Xiamen, Ningbo, Shanghai's five ports, without hindrance to trade”. In the course of the negotiation of the Tianjin Treaty, however, the Qingting acceded to the unequal provisions of real interest, such as the payment of compensation for the land, but only to the ceremonial provisions of the Minister's presence in Japan and the Emperor. (34) However, with the increasing influence of Western countries in politics and diplomacy in China, traditional diplomatic rituals are not sustainable. In the face of changes in the current situation, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Zeng Guo Guo and Zong Cong Chong, among others, have all written in favour of “ad hoc measures” in ceremonial matters. It is also the view of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United States of America that, during the year in which Dao Guang, which had made treaties with each other, is now “a State parallel to the enemy” and is “not treated as one's own”. (35) On this basis, on 20 May 1873, the Qingcheng Government issued an edict “issuing permission to any person who wishes to submit a communication to the Qinking States, to grant permission for a visit”, agreed to the permanent presence of Western emissaries in Beijing and abolished the traditional rituals of worship, such as kowtow and bow; and intergovernmental notes of equality, which no longer use terms such as “unclemency” “preliminary”. (36) This series of diplomatic events, despite their ceremonial manifestations, has fundamentally shaken the perception system in which the Qingtings live “to the top of the sky”, marking the end of the fratricidal order that has been shaped by the “underworld” and which has come to an end with the dramatic impact of the recent system of sovereign States. The transformation of diplomatic attitudes has given a strong impetus to the realignment of the Government ' s national security strategy and to the gradual shift of its strategic focus from moral and euphemism to practical interests among sovereign States. In the face of the growing and deepening aggression against China by the Western Powers, the knowledgeable men of the time had become acutely aware that, although China was known as “geo-mask”, national security lifelines such as railways, mines, customs and taxation were already in danger of “whaling” by the powerful. As a result, the community of doctors and doctors has become aware of the need to preserve national sovereignty and security through diplomatic means in the course of their study and adaptation to modern-day diplomacy. The term “sovereignty” was introduced for the first time in 1889 when the two then-Governors Zhang Jianguo Zhang Zhang Zhang Zhue Zhui Zheng Dynasty was reported on the crossing of the Portuguese border. (37) Since then, when Zhou Zhou Zhou Zhou Zhou Zhou was in the middle of the Chinese-Russian negotiations, he also stated that “the right to such benefits belongs to the outsiders and the sovereignty is lost to a great extent”. (38) On this basis, the Qing Government has also reflected and adjusted its previous national security strategy, and there is a growing consensus on the perception of a change of course to “preservation of the sovereignty of China”. Ocean affairs officials played an important role in that process. The old-age officials at the time advocated “the adoption of the words of the Order and the reverence of the Zhou Zhou Quang and the desire to be recited by men of Sming's will to the sons and daughters of His Majesty's subjects. If one is not aware of the meaning of the law, despite the wisdom of the police or the fear of harming the public, Li Hongzhang and others are accused of “the shame of teaching foreigners, and the fear of the world is used to justify the State's decency and shame”. (39) In this regard, Li Hongzhang rebuts the argument that “the foreign people, regardless of their position, are under military pressure, and I will not be able to win with my tongue” and (40) that “China will not become a legal person, and will not fight with others, lest the longer be wronged” ... (41) The national security strategy no longer depends on the ethical narrative of Confucian ethics in the context of “a major change of the past”, but must pursue a viable national security strategy that firmly preserves national sovereignty and security. On this basis, while advocating active learning from Western countries in disciplines such as military politics, ship administration, pacekeeping, manufacturing, and following the example of Western countries, they have embarked on the establishment of a formal diplomatic service and a permanent diplomatic envoy, taking an active part in international contacts as sovereign States and actively contributing to a favourable external security environment. (ii) From “all-embracing” to “right-to-interest”: the cognitive evolution of economic sovereignty

The Government's lack of awareness of the near-modern economic sovereignty, influenced by the traditional economic ideology of “hard farming”, has led to repeated failures in foreign economic negotiations. After the opium war, the Qing Government not only granted many privileges to the United Kingdom in areas such as customs trade, but also readily accepted the one-sided MFN clause of “one-size-fits-all” countries, so that other small countries could easily access the economic privileges of the great powers in China, creating a deformity of “no taxes on ocean and no taxes on Chinese”. (42) “Reading from trade among countries, imports of ocean and sea goods have grown to as much as 19 million in value in recent years. The annual reduction of exports of earth goods by one year is often not mutually compatible.” (43) The serious damage to China's economic sovereignty caused by such unequal provisions can be seen. The economic aggression of the Western countries has contributed to the evolution of the concept of economic sovereignty in the era of late liquidation. Following the first opium war, Wei Qin and others saw first-hand the power of the West's strong ship cannons and took the lead in putting forward the idea of “shows to raze”, a concept that was later inherited and put into practice by the oceanists. Since the 1960s, Ocean Affairs has created a series of modern-day national industries, such as the Golden Hills Machine Bureau and the Tianjin Machine Bureau. However, as the oceanic movement unfolds, the established bureaucratic industry is increasingly facing challenges such as lack of financial resources, lack of talent and lack of raw materials, and the “self-empowerment” strategy has been reduced to a lack of roots without a socio-economic basis. Against this background, Oceanic officials have come to realize that the “self-empowerment” of the military industry alone will not reverse the weakness of the State and that it is necessary to build a more solid national security base, starting with socio-economic development, and to develop a “stronger than rich” national security ideology. For example, Xue Fook Sung has proposed that “China's geographies, located on five continents, seek autonomy, first seek self-empowerment, first seek self-empowerment and first seek wealth”. (44) This security philosophy has led the Government to actively pursue a “business war” strategy for the benefit of foreign traders. It has set up, in turn, the Ship Recruitment Bureau, the Cape Town Mining Authority, the Shanghai Machine Weave Bureau and the General Directorate of Telegraph, among others, to boycott the sea and to compete for market-oriented, modern-day civilian enterprises, which have become a key starting point for modern-day national industries in China, providing an important support for national security capacity-building and, to some extent, promoting the development of national business and industry. However, the “business war” of the Qing Government has always been subject to the privileged status of foreign goods under unequal treaties, and issues such as the loss of economic sovereignty and the dependence of the customs and financial sectors on foreign countries have not been fundamentally addressed, leaving national industries at a systemic disadvantage in their competition. Although the so-called “business war” has touched upon the link between economic sovereignty and national security, it remains limited to competition at the commodity level in an unequal market environment, reflecting the limitations of the Government's economic perception and national security strategy during this period. In the aftermath of the Meridian War, the means of economic aggression by the Western Powers against China gradually shifted from commodity exports to industrial capital exports. China ' s infrastructure and raw materials were the main targets. China ' s economic sovereignty and national security were seriously threatened by the massive seizure of Chinese railways and mineral interests through compulsory loans, road mortgages and unequal treaties. The famous industrialist Wong Sing Yong always called it: “A country that has begun its course, and after that, it cannot be equal, it must be greedy, it will lose its power and it will not be tolerated.” (45) In response to the new dynamic of economic aggression by the great powers, the Government's perception of economic sovereignty has gradually deepened and has focused on the “right to profit” of tariff autonomy and industrial sovereignty. “I have the right to self-determination, my business, my duty to protect.” (46) Zhang ' s hole, on the other hand, makes it clear in the construction of domestic industries: “China will do so only on the basis of the charter of its merchants, without prejudice to China ' s sovereignty, and on the basis of the best interests of China and no disadvantages. They must be part of business and industry, so nothing can be done for the benefit of businessmen.” (47) Since then, the Qing Dynasty has been rethinking and adjusting its previous “one-size-fits-all” policy, thereby contributing to the creation and development of the “recovery rights movement”. At the time, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sang-hee, put forward “the place of the right of profit, which is justified and irretrievably unrecoverable” and called for a careful study of the text of the current treaty, so that it “knows what I have lost”, on the basis of which it would be “the right of the profit of the profit and the profit of the profit”. (48) Cheong Zhu, on the other hand, advocates the gradual restoration of China's customs sovereignty through detailed research and research into “methods of preparation for his future contract” (49). In this vein, the Government has issued a series of policy measures to restrict the rights of foreigners in Hong Kong, in the areas of shipboarding, engineering, railway mining, telecommunications and taxation. In August 1905, the Qing Government announced the annulment of the contract with the Chinese American-American Corporation for the recovery of the construction of the railway in Qinghan; in 1908, the Qing Government took over the sovereignty of important minerals, such as the Jinxi coal mine, the Guangzhou coal mine and the Gangbei coal mine, thereby preserving the economic lifeline of the country, and marking the awakening and development of the consciousness of late-night economic sovereignty. (50)

(iii) From “a borderless” to “sovereign borders”: the concept of border security is redefined

In the fratricidal order built by the traditional “underground view”, border areas are often held in a state of ambiguity rather than in a modern sense of sovereignty. China's traditional approach to national security has long been based on a strategy of “within and outside” and has demonstrated a clear defensive orientation towards border security issues. The past dynasty's administration of border areas has also been characterized by a system of “rule by custom”, such as seals, detention, and toast, with the aim of establishing a stable order of “surprising peace”. Qing Dynasty has shown a positive dynamic in the expansion of its borders, creating a vast, unified, multi-ethnic empire whose border security strategy has not yet moved away from the traditional model of “within and outside”. With the continuous invasions of Western powers and the introduction of the concept of national sovereignty in the late dawn period, the geologic environment of border security has changed, and the former modern vision of borders with no borders has collided with the rigid border concept of modern sovereign States, posing a systemic challenge to the border security of Chong Dynasty. Since the opium war, the Western Powers have exploited the lack of a sense of sovereignty in the Qingcheng Government and have arbitrarily appropriated the territory of the Chinese border. In this regard, the yellow sentence says: “China is vast, it does not know the boundaries of its border areas, it does not care, and it is indifferent. Thus, in recent years, our country has lost ten times more than it has lost its own land as a result of demarcation than it has lost its place in war. Today, Bhutan's mudslides have returned to England, and since then the three have been hidden for more than 6,000 miles on the side of the river, with no place but the teeth of the five insects, even if they do not swallow them.” (51) It is also submitted that: “China has kept the promise of great joy in order to avoid the temptation to live in Qi's land, and the result is that Ishida was given, and the result was that he did not go too far. Gu Ishida is in danger, and he is in distress. And We see it as a waste, and leave it, and one of them runs it, and it becomes a fertile land, to take away from us. "I see that one of them is left behind, and the other one is removed from his town, so that he may take me to a town where I can live, and there will be no end, no end, no end, no end, no end." (52)

In this context, traditional border security concepts have become difficult to adapt to the realities of border governance. The wise men of that time began to call for a change of Government and for a clear sovereign border to be established as soon as possible. In May 1881, in the face of a domestic “deposition” of the territory that had abandoned its border as a buffer zone, the Declaration pointed out, in contrast, that “the border between the two countries from time immemorial must be as large as that of Hunun, so that the border would be increased and the border would be restored. As the world of the three nations, Wu and Wei moved their people, leaving the land light. As it was in the middle, But surely there will be a male among them. East Hu was dead, and he turned away, and He was given Wei Zhen, and was lightened to the south. There is nothing left between the land of Ende's closure” (53) which emphasizes, in China's ancient historical experience, the sense of sovereignty over which the land is bound. As he also pointed out in his last speech on the Pfikmen border, “the situation in the Western Ocean, where the two countries are bound by each other, there is no doubt about the situation, the repair of the cannons, the construction of the barracks, despite the fact that they are alive and well-equipped, can make peace with each other. To that end, Yunnan's south-west side, which is now bordered by the most powerful countries in the Western Ocean, has advocated an active study of Western border policies and effective jurisdiction over the border areas of Fyomang. As a result, the Qing Dynasty has also begun to try to use modern technological means to clarify its sovereign borders with international law. In 1906, the Border Division of the Ministry of Civil Affairs was established in Chingting to begin mapping the border areas. At the same time, the Qingting has tried to transform vague border areas into clear borders with legal basis through the conclusion of international treaties. For example, in 1909, China signed the Agreement on the Status of the Republic of Korea in the Tumen River, and in 1911, China and the Russian Federation signed the Manchuria Treaty, which establishes the boundary between the Central and Eastern Russian Sector. While this process is accompanied by a loss of territorial sovereignty, it contributes objectively to the process of moving border areas from a “boundaryless” ambiguity to a clear sovereign border based on international law. In addition, in addition to the land boundary, the maritime boundary has also begun to be integrated into the security perspective of Chong Dynasty. As early as the opium war, front-line officials, represented by Lin Tzu, were acutely aware of the advantages of the maritime power of the Western countries and the importance of strengthening maritime defence. He made it clear that “sea-water warfare is a razing technique” (55) “the theft of ships, artillery and water forces is self-defeating and defeating”. (56) The failure of the second opium war led to increased awareness of the importance of maritime defence. At that time, Jiangsu was the commander of Wu Won Bing, who said, “The way outside is not to defend the sea; the sea is not to be played over the seamen”. (57) At the same time, the Emperor of Zhang also proposed, in Retchen ' s Purchase of Exterior Ships, that “the purchase of offshore arms be the first priority of today ' s rescue”. (58) In article 6 of its Statute of the Marine Waterworks, Tin Zhichang proposed the construction of a modern navy. He stressed that the construction of the Navy should focus not only on the acquisition of advanced Western ships, but also on the building of an autonomous military industry and the training of naval personnel, with the ultimate goal of “a combination of North and South-East China”. Zach Tsai Tung, over 5,000 miles north and south of the ocean, and the key coastal hazards are linked to each other as the snakes of Changshan, head-to-head (59) strategic configuration. Since then, the Qingting has established three water divisions in the North, South and Fujian regions, as well as the Prime Minister's Office of Naval Affairs, which coordinates maritime defence matters and formally upgrades maritime defence issues to the strategic level of national security. Even the left Zong Cong Chong, represented by the S&C, has suggested that “the East China Sea, West Serbia and the West, the two are urgent and difficult”, (60) reflecting the gradual strategic shift from a single land border to a “sea and land side” of the security consciousness. The transformation of the concept of border security has facilitated the realignment of the Government's border management strategy from “within and outside” to “within and outside”. The lessons learned from the invasion of Xinjiang in 1865 and the Russian-Russian war in 1904 have led the Qing Government to realize that the traditional model of governance, “regulated by custom” “within and outside”, has become difficult to cope with the growing border security crisis, and to advocate for a tighter system of governance to achieve integrated governance of border areas. (61) Upon his return to Xinjiang in 1877, Zhao Zongjiang advocated the establishment of a province in Xinjiang, “to draw up a plan for a long-term solution for Xinjiang and to alleviate the concerns of Tingxi Guang, and to establish provinces and re-provinces for which there is no alternative”. (62) Under its auspices, the Province of Xinjiang was formally established in 1884, abolishing the Berk system inherited from the colonial period and moving to a state and county system consistent with the interior. In the north-eastern region, faced with the swift pace of the Japanese-Russian forces, Xu Shichang proposed that “since the Japanese-Russian war, the two powers have spread between the North and the South ... China's territory is hardly a place for us”, so that the people of the eastern three provinces “has little to say about their country and their people”. (63) On this basis, he advocates the abolition of the old eight-flagged military system, the establishment of a unified provincial system and the strengthening of the direct administration of the Central Government over the three eastern provinces. In 1907, the Qing Government transformed the former military hierarchy into a provincial one, with the provinces of Bong Tian, Jilin and Heilongjiang, respectively, under the new “Governor of the East three provinces”. On this basis, the Qing Government has continued to strengthen the socio-economic links between the border areas and the interior through measures such as immigration, construction of railways and recultivation, and to continue the process of integrated transformation of border governance. This series of strategic initiatives not only clarifies the spatial boundaries of border security, but also promotes China ' s profound transition to a modern sovereign State at the historical level. III. CONTEMPORARY RELEVANTS OF THE TRANSPORT OF CHINA ' S NATIONAL SECURITY PERSPECTIVE

The transformation and reformulation of national security at the end of the era is not only an important chapter in China’s recent intellectual and political history, but also a difficult quest for national security concepts and practices in the face of “a major change of more than 3,000 years.” Despite the inevitable historical limitations of this transition process, the historical logic, ideas and practical experience it contains provide us with a valuable historical perspective for the modernization of national security systems and capacities in today's “hundred-year-olds of major changes”. (i) Establishment of a pragmatic strategic orientation for national security

At the heart of the shift in the traditional national security vision of the late dawn is the shift from an ideal order based on the “underworld” to a reality based on the “sovereign view”. The traditional “underground view” shapes a concept of security that is bound by cultural identity and ethics, hierarchical and strongly desirable. However, the late historical experience has shown that when such a concept of security, defined by vague limits of sovereignty and lack of clarity of interests, colludes with a modern system of sovereign States that emphasizes sovereign equality and real interests, harms national security cannot be avoided. For this reason, China ' s national security efforts in the new era must further define the content and boundaries of national security and establish a practical strategic orientation for national security. First, national interests have always been a fundamental point of departure for national security strategies. The modernization of the concept of national security is reflected, first and foremost, in the modernization of the capacity to recognize and maintain the interests of the State. The late-cleansing group of liberals, in the midst of the national interests of railways, mines, customs, and taxation, has gradually awakened to the need to preserve national sovereignty and security, and has made a historic transition from a traditional “underground” to a modern “sovereignty” view. The overall national security perspective emphasizes the importance of upholding the primacy of national interests as the starting point for the development of national security strategies. Current national security efforts should be guided by the need for real national interests, a strong sense of opportunity to defend national interests, a strengthening of bottom-line thinking in defence of national interests, innovative ways and means of defending national interests, and a more determined and effective defence of national interests, particularly core ones. Second, the national sovereignty and independence of States must be firmly upheld. The transformation of the concept of national security at the end of the day has led to a change in the Government's perception of the concept of sovereignty from a blurry in the traditional “underground view” to a clear subject of rights and responsibilities in the sense of modern international law, and to the gradual establishment of legal boundaries and real boundaries for the exercise of sovereignty. Sovereign independence and territorial integrity are fundamental prerequisites for the survival and development of the State and an essential foundation for the maintenance of national security. Since its inception, the modern system of nation-State has established the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity and non-interference in internal affairs as basic norms of international relations. At present, the national security environment facing China is becoming more complex, with the sovereignty component extending from a single territorial sovereignty to emerging areas such as biological resources and digital space. This requires that we remain firm and uncompromising on key issues of national sovereignty, security and development interests. At the same time, international law and rules should be applied proactively to actively participate in and shape an international order favourable to China, to promote the extension of the principle of sovereignty to new and emerging areas of global governance and to provide solid institutional support for the establishment of national security barriers. Thirdly, science and technology enable national security capacity-building. In the face of the historical changes of the late dawn period, as described earlier, Li Hongzhang and others have argued that “the argument of the foreigners, with their military might, must be won with a few words,” and have revealed the seriousness of the external environment of national security; and that “China, if it does not become a law, will speak out against others and will fear being bullied” in favour of actively learning from the Western countries and viewing it as “the very essence of China's self-empowerment”. (64) This recognition marks a shift in China ' s traditional approach to national security, which depends not only on moral advantages but also on hard power backed by advanced technology. In a new era, science and technology have become a fundamental, strategic element of national security capacity-building. General Secretary Xi stated: “Scientific self-reliance and self-reliance are essential for the country's strength and security.” (65) This requires that we place science, technology and innovation at the centre of our national security system, that we promote the empowerment of science and technology across the military, economic, information, ecological and other security spheres, and that we accelerate the self-reliance of key core technologies and build the foundations of national security from being hostage to people in vital areas. (ii) Integrated quality development and high level of security

The evolution of the concept of economic security in the late-cleansing period, from “all-embracing” to “right-of-interest”, has revealed the mutually reinforcing interlinkages between economic development and national security. Development and security are two wings and two wheels that drive one another, and they are one and the other. It is therefore important to grasp and manage the relationship between development and security, to insist on solid security in development, to develop in security, to achieve good interaction between high-quality development and high-level security. On the one hand, security is a prerequisite for development. At the end of the evening, the West's aggression against the Chinese economy intensified, and the Qing Government, although promoting the construction of a near-modern national industry, actively launched a “commercial war” with foreign countries. However, its economic development strategy had always been carried out in an environment of incomplete sovereignty and unequal rules, the loss of economic sovereignty and the constraints on people in key areas of major security problems had not been effectively addressed, and its inability to build an independent and autonomous system of economic security had perpetuated the institutional disadvantage of national industrial development. Achieving a high level of security is an important guarantee of China's modernization. The Secretary-General of Xi stated: “The promotion of innovative development, coordinated development, green development, open development and shared development are prerequisites for national security and social stability. Nothing can be said without security and stability.” (66) This requires that we follow a holistic approach to national security that integrates the security system and capacity-building into all areas and processes of development, that gives prominence to the security and autonomy of development, and that effectively enhances security in the areas of food, energy resources, industrial chain supply chains, data, etc., in order to protect high-quality development with high levels of security. On the other hand, development is a guarantee of security. At the end of the day, as the economic aggression of the Western countries continues, the pragmatic officials represented by Li Hongzhang and Xuefu have fully recognized the limitations of military construction and the importance of socio-economic development in the national security of the early aspects of the ocean affairs movement. “The old state must be rich and strong; it must be rich in life, and the country should be strong” (67) and so on, marking the deepening of its perception of the relationship between development and security. At the moment, high-quality development is the primary task in the overall construction of a modern socialist State, the basis and key to resolving all Chinese problems, and non-development is the greatest insecurity. This requires that we continue to use the development gains to strengthen national security on a strong basis, to strengthen the country ' s economic, scientific and technological capacity and to integrate the State, with particular emphasis on the development of key areas of life, such as employment, education, social security and health, so that the development gains reach the entire population more and more equitably, to increase the people ' s sense of access, well-being and security and to provide a solid material basis and a solid support for national security and social stability. (68)

(iii) National security governance system built on internal outreach

The increasingly serious border issues of the late dawn period reveal the limitations of the traditional pattern of “inside and out”, which severs “in and out” from “in and out” in the near-modern pattern of international relations. In the aftermath of the border crisis, the late-cleaning border security concept gradually shifted from a “boundaryless” ambiguity to a modern “sovereign border” — marking the beginning of a strategic shift beyond the “within and outside” of the traditional security concept to explore a “outside” system of governance. At present, the “internal” and “outside” relations of national security are no longer limited to the question of the relationship between the interior and the frontier in the traditional context, but are manifested in the complex situation of the profound interconnectivity of the domestic and international situation and the interlocking of traditional and non-traditional security risks. China ' s development and security are increasingly linked to the world: Domestic economic and social risks may spill over as a source of external challenges, and international instability, geopolitical conflicts and global crises can be rapidly transmitted to countries, affecting social stability and development. In this connection, the General Secretary of Xi stated: “The leadership has two major goals, one of the strategic aspects of the great renaissance of the Chinese nation and the other of the major changes that have not occurred in the world for a hundred years, which is the basic point of departure for our work.” (69) In this context, national security efforts need to view internal and external security as an indivisible whole, with an overall planning and unified deployment to build an internal outreach national security governance system. Internally, social governance systems should be developed and improved. The system of social governance is an important contribution to the modernization of the national security system and security capacity. At present, the security situation in China is generally stable, but various social risks remain. To this end, first, the effectiveness of national governance should be continuously enhanced. Through the improvement of social governance and public service systems, the capacity to mobilize social resources and organize people is strengthened, so as to achieve social cohesion in the maintenance of national security. Second, efforts are being made to improve social risk management systems. Establish sound scientific safety risk identification and assessment mechanisms for early identification, early warning and early disposal, in particular against major security risks, such as food, energy and public health security, that may affect the livelihood and development of society. Thirdly, the development of a national security, rule of law system should be strengthened. The rule-of-law system of national security is an important component of the national security system and it is essential to accelerate the advancement of legislation in the priority areas of national security, to fill legal gaps and to enhance the systematic, forward-looking and operational nature of laws and regulations, with a particular focus on the rule of law in the emerging area of security, to ensure that national security efforts are law-based and rule-based and to establish a solid basis for the rule of law for the maintenance of national security. Externally, it is to contribute to the Chinese programme for global security governance. In April 2022, General Secretary Xi launched the Global Security Initiative, emphasizing the importance of a common, integrated, cooperative and sustainable security concept. In the face of a complex and difficult external environment, China should be guided by the Global Security Initiative, firmly uphold the international system, with the United Nations at its core, engage deeply in the development of global security and governance rules, promote a framework for balanced, stable and cooperative relations among major Powers and deepen friendly cooperation with neighbouring and developing countries. On this basis, international multilateral cooperation should be actively expanded through a high level of openness and international cooperation to transform external resources, markets and opportunities into an engine of self-development and security. At the same time, it is necessary to continue to improve its foreign-related national security mechanisms, to effectively safeguard China's security interests abroad, to resist unilateral sanctions and “long-arms jurisdiction” and to enhance its ability to address all aspects of security risks in international games. Concluding remarks

The concept of national security, which is derived from the perception of national security issues and the choice of ways to preserve it, is a dynamic reflection of social development and the security situation, and its ideological content must evolve as the conditions of the times evolve, with significant transformations and re-constructions taking place at the key points of historical change. Under the umbrella of the “underground view”, the ideological content and characteristics of China's traditional national security concept have been perpetuated by successive dynasties. However, in the face of the dramatic impact of the “big change of more than three thousand years” in the late-cleaning period, China's traditional national security concept has undergone a profound transformation: from a hierarchical “war razed order” to a modern norm of international relations in which sovereign States have equal access; from a passive acceptance of “one size” inequality clauses in economic sovereignty by the late-cleaning Government to the active pursuit of the core interests of “right to profit”; and from a vague “boundary-free” state of border security to the gradual establishment of clear sovereign borders based on international law and treaty systems. These three main lines are interwoven and advancing in concert, marking the re-establishment of China's national security perspective from the traditional “underground” to the modern “sovereign” perspective. While the development transformation of national security in the late dawn period was largely a reactive response under the “shock-reaction” model, it did not fundamentally change the current-generation poverty and weakness of China. However, the process of transition has clearly charted the course of China’s transition from a traditional empire to a modern sovereign state, not only reshaping the recent Chinese understanding of its relations with the world, but also providing a profound historical inspiration for the modernization of the national security system and capacity. At present, China is in the middle of a century-old revolution. It is on the basis of a deep insight into the tides of the times and the patterns of historical development that the general concept of national security is presented as a strong response to this key point in history. National security must be guided by an overall national security perspective, with a pragmatic national security strategic orientation, a coordinated high-quality development and a high level of security, a system of internal and external outreach for national security governance, and a firm national security barrier to the full promotion of strong nation-building and national renewal in China. Notes:

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