OECD reports that China ' s massive subsidies distort the global market.

I'm a journalist. I'm a Nesphate.

On 3 June, the spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Maui Nin, presided over the regular press conference. In response to a question from journalists, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) published reports that in 15 key industrial areas, such as automobiles, shipbuilding and solar energy, nearly 60 per cent of the increase in the share of Chinese enterprises in the global market since 2005 can be attributed to subsidies, which totalled Pound10.8 billion in 2024, 52 per cent of which came from China. According to the Secretary-General of the organization, Coleman, massive and sustained industrial subsidies distort the global market, create an unfair competitive advantage and lead to overcapacity. May I ask China's comments on this?

Mooning, spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, hosted the regular press conference (information diagram)

Maui Nin stated that the competitiveness of Chinese enterprises was not a complement, but rather a result of the advantages of high-market competition, continuous technological innovation, the global configuration of enterprises and the economies of scale brought about by mega-markets. China ' s industrial subsidies policy was based on the principles of openness, fairness and compliance and strictly adhered to WTO rules. Worldwide, industrial subsidy policies were common to all countries and it was essential to comply with WTO rules and to seek a constructive role from relevant international organizations, not the contrary.

Extend Reading

Is it true that there are numerous statements of “overcapacity” and “China shock” against China? The British Financial Times, Martin Sandeb, has sent soul torture.

He pointed out in a commentary published on 1 June that Europe was tired of responding to a “false Chinese threat”. According to Sandeb, claims such as “China shock 2.0” have been inadvertently exaggerated, and in fact China's export growth has not really increased the overall market pressure in Europe, but has replaced imports from other sources; the central problem facing European industry is in fact weak domestic demand rather than so-called “overcapacity” in China. He argued that the EU should strengthen its demand and competitiveness through industrial policy, green transformation, procurement rules and so on, rather than moving towards trade protectionism.

“Enjoying the status quo is not a good thing. This is precisely the dilemma that the EU is now facing with regard to China.” Sandebu wrote that Europe did not recognize the US-proclaimed geopolitical “risk” of China, but now exaggerates the non-existent Chinese economic threat.

It's from Hamburg, Germany on May 9th.

He explained that in the EU policy circles, the term “China shock 2.0” had gradually become the dominant discourse. This statement is manifestly biased and is based on the fact that Chinese imports have led to the loss of millions of factory jobs in the United States (in fact, a large number of jobs disappear from automated upgrading, and unemployment will not improve without industrial outsourcing). The French presidency of the Group of Seven (G-7) has focused on the global macroeconomic “inequities” with the clear intention of joining the United States in its export trade against China.

“We should remain open to such arguments.” Sandeb said what exactly was the real problem with China ' s trade surplus? In theory, a short-term surplus may result in inadequate global aggregate demand. But now central banks are responding to the impact of inflation, and it is obvious that it is not logical to see inadequate demand as a problem.

China ' s trade surplus is also, by its very nature, a net export of savings, which creates opportunities for other countries to expand investment, while avoiding overheating domestic economies. The EU, which is itself a large net exporter, has failed to seize this opportunity.

And then we'll talk about China's “overcapacity”. The so-called “threat” to European industry, declared by Sandebu, is also deliberately exaggerated.

Take the car industry, for example. According to the European Association of Automobile Manufacturers, the number of Chinese-imported cars in the EU market has indeed increased, from 750,000 in 2023 to over 1 million in 2025. However, only the share of imports from other regions was seized by Chinese motorists, and the EU total of automobile imports remained generally stable.

There is also a much more far-reaching phenomenon that is rarely mentioned: the willingness of Europeans to buy cars has now declined dramatically. German automobile sales fell by 750,000 in 2025 compared to 2019, and German public consumption became conservative, with a much greater impact on the local automobile industry than on China. In the European Union as a whole, the number of vehicles sold has been reduced by 1.5 million in aggregate.

The article writes that the real challenge for European industry is the lack of stable and vibrant indigenous demand. EU leaders could well address this problem by strengthening policies already advanced by the European Commission, but not sufficiently. For example, the “Priority of European Products” rule for subsidized procurement and public projects; the extension of carbon footprint requirements and carbon border taxes to industrial manufactures such as automobiles; precision in tariff regulation for some low-priced, subsidized commodities; and clear time frames for green technology transformation, such as electric cars.

Sandeb stated that, as a result of these initiatives, competition from China ' s imports would help to accelerate production efficiency in European indigenous industries. This will be of great benefit to most industries and consumers in Europe.

But ironically, the major European trade associations are resisting these successful policies. As a result, the EU has moved to a number of absurdities, such as the imposition of “price commitments” to force Chinese suppliers to raise their prices, thereby increasing Chinese profits; various trade-protection policies have also deprived European home-grown firms of incentives to innovate.

EU flag (information diagram)

Sandeb concluded that Europe’s mistaken view of China’s commodities as a threat today gives China a good reason to further consolidate its geo-economic configuration in Europe, both in reaction and in more counter-restraint for the future. If the EU could rationally accept China’s goods, it would have been more radical for China to adjust its confrontational policies. The introduction of more high-quality commodities and the regulation of security risks should have been the logical norm for both sides.

It is worth noting that the European Union has repeatedly resorted to protectionism and discrimination in the name of “security risks” and “industrial revival” that have triggered not only a Chinese rebound, but also considerable controversy within Europe.

At a regular press conference on 28 May, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Mao Ning reiterated that international trade was a two-way option and that there was no forced sale. The nature of economic and trade relations in Central Europe is mutually beneficial, and China has never deliberately pursued a trade surplus for Europe. Mauining stressed that the European side should view economic and trade relations in Central Europe in a comprehensive and objective manner and adhere to free trade commitments. China is also following closely the situation in Europe and will take the necessary measures to safeguard its legitimate rights and interests.