Orbital Competition — China's Great Space Challenge

China's growing counterspace capabilities are a cause for concern. Even though no conflict has ever occurred in space, the incentive to influence activities on earth by controlling space remains a potential trigger for future confrontation. Beijing's development of anti-satellite missiles and co-orbital systems blurs the line between routine space operations and counter-space activities.

The key question is how Beijing views its space ambitions and control over space, and what India can do to safeguard its vital interests in this area.

Beijing's space ambitions

While China's space program emphasizes the peaceful use of space, evidence suggests that China is preparing for orbital warfare.

In January 2007, it targeted its own satellite from Earth. In October 2015, China tested an exo-atmospheric vehicle designed to strike a hostile satellite. In 2022, China used a robotic spacecraft to push a defunct satellite into graveyard orbit. In 2024, it demonstrated orbital air combat. There is a clear research and development push to deploy offensive capabilities in space.

China's space ambitions are on two levels. First, it seeks to remain competitive in the emerging space race, both technologically and digitally. China has about 1,900 satellites in orbit, compared to more than 8,000 U.S. satellites, including SpaceX satellites.

Second, it recognizes the military and economic implications of space weaponization. A single strike could disrupt communications, power grids, navigation systems, financial markets, and military command and control (C2) and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) networks.

As a result, China aims to land on the Moon by 2036, launch a nuclear-powered shuttle by 2040, and establish a solar energy system by 2050. Chinese startups such as LandSpace, iSpace, and OneSpace compete with competitors such as SpaceX and Blue Origin. China is also exploring mining on the Moon and asteroids to produce energy and critical minerals. The growing demand for energy-efficient data centers risks further intensifying the space race.

China seeks to assert its control over space in two distinct ways. First, by leveraging space assets to protect its military and economic systems. Second, by competing with rivals – both numerically and technologically – to maintain space superiority. Its most immediate competitor is Starlink in low Earth orbit (LEO). China plans to deploy more than 36,000 LEO satellites by 2030. This rivalry could intensify if China becomes the first to establish a presence on the far side of the Moon or demonstrate a particular interest in exploiting asteroid resources. Such developments could create a dynamic of escalation in an environment lacking a comprehensive regulatory framework.

Therefore, China's capabilities are evolving in three key areas. First, kinetic attack systems such as the DN-3 and SC-19 missiles, capable of physically destroying satellites. Second, laser systems that can dazzle or blind satellites, disrupting navigation and communications. Third, co-orbital satellites, such as the SJ and TJS series, designed to interfere with or dislodge other satellites from their orbit. Together, these capabilities could allow the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to cripple intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), GPS and communications networks, thereby shaping the battlespace during the first 24 to 48 hours of a conflict.

Implications for India

If a contingency arises in Taiwan, the PLA will likely first blind ISR and communications networks before resorting to brutal attacks. This would give Beijing time to shape its narrative, while a brutal killing could trigger an immediate escalation.

The United States should then assess China's military objectives and, if an invasion proceeds, neutralize its counter-space capabilities. Even though both sides risk losing assets, the United States would likely maintain an advantage due to its greater redundancy and resilience. The Taiwan scenario applies to India, albeit on a lesser scale. India has around sixty operational satellites, compared to more than 400 Chinese military satellites alone, which implies less redundancy. The loss of five or six satellites will further harm India.

Hypothetically, China could strike the CARTOSAT/RISAT series, which could result in loss of tactical imagery for hours or even days. Instead, if it only chooses to laser these satellites as they pass over the Line of Actual Control, this could lead to temporary blind spots. They could even deploy jammers to disable India's NavIC system.

The main strategic takeaway is that while China can carry out peacetime harassment using lasers and jammers, or temporarily blind a few satellites during a border crisis, it cannot inflict crippling damage without destroying large numbers of Indian satellites and risking serious consequences from Kessler syndrome. Although Mission Shakti has strengthened India’s deterrence posture, its usefulness remains limited. Additionally, a single successful test does not guarantee operational reliability, and India still lacks co-orbital capabilities to counter satellites such as the SJ and TJS series.

Safeguarding India’s interests

Some measures are relevant. First, India needs to expand its space industry beyond the Indian Space Research Organization to increase satellite production and launch capacity. Greater capacity translates to greater redundancy. Second, it should divide large satellite programs, such as GSAT, into smaller, more resilient and viable constellations. Third, India must strengthen the protection of its ground-based space assets to mitigate the impact of brutal attacks. Fourth, it should strengthen data sharing agreements with strategic partners so that in the event of a satellite loss, critical services can be restored via commercial or partner networks within hours.

Furthermore, India should also clearly define its red lines and the scope of a proportionate response to ensure that China fully understands the scale of potential escalation.

Harinder Singh is a former corps commander

Published - Jun 02, 2026 at 00:08 IST