The battle between the United States and the Yanan Military Observer Group

Author: Lucina, Lecturer, Institute of History and Culture, Shanxi University, National Centre for Research on Revolucionary Antiquities

Source: Anti-Japanese War Research, No. 1 of 2026, notes omitted

Executive summary: From February to June 1944, a debate broke out between senior United States officials and the National Government over the dispatch of the military observer group in Yanan. The national Government has been slow to push, while the United States has taken a strong stance, with both sides fighting hard. The strategic mutual trust between the United States and Chiang Kai-shek is at stake during months of confrontation. Chiang Kai-shek eventually agreed to the team's plan, but not out of a true understanding of the strategic significance of United States cooperation with the Chinese Communist Party, but in order to enlist the support of the United States Government. But difficult interventions have left the United States high-level disillusioned with its national government, whose military defeat and political and economic crisis have led to the emergence of the idea of abandoning Chiang Kai-shek, as well as a wave of public opinion in the United States society critical of the national government. The implementation of the Military Observer Group ' s plan was the beginning of a formal relationship between the United States Government and the Communist Party of China. Keywords: Anti-Japanese War, Janan Military Observer Group, Chiang Kai-shek, U.S. government, US-China strategy

The deployment of the military observer group in Yanan in 1944 was the starting point for the establishment of official links between the United States Government and the Communist Party of China. Since February 1944, when the plan was officially launched by the United States and the operation was finally implemented in July of that year, the United States has had difficult negotiations with the national Government. The academic research on the subject has been extremely rich, in terms of the evolution of relations between China and the United States during the war and the CCP's foreign policy towards the United States. Wang Jian Lang and Chen Hongmin, through their study of Chiang Kai-shek Diary, reflected on the tripartite relationship between the National Government, the CCP and the United States in the post-war period. Seo Sun, Zhao Zhiwei, Uchimin, Cow Army, Yang Tung Qi and Hu Chinese Army, together with a compilation of various files, reviewed the diplomatic tactics of the Communist Party before and after the deployment of the Observer Group. Hu Viet Young focused on the visit of United States Vice President Henry Wallace to China, and analysed the reasons, process and impact of the United States observation team. What was the process of intercession that had taken place between the two sides following the plan of the Observatory? After Wallace's visit, how did the United States Government end up in a position to compromise? What are the trade-offs and preparations for Chiang Kai-shek's compromise? Are there other potential incentives to influence the United States-Cyang game beyond the elements of international relations? In order to answer these questions, the authors have access to the collections of the National Archives of the United States, the President Roosevelt Library and the Second Historical Archives of China, which are complementary to the original data of China and the United States. In addition to the Government ' s official correspondence, this paper draws on the Chiang Kai-shek Diaries, the Wallace Diaries, to compare official history with private records. The plan of the military observer group in Yanan involves relations not only between China and the United States, but also between China, the United Kingdom and the United States. These forces are so disproportionate that they cannot be ignored and ultimately influence decision-making on both sides. In view of the process of negotiations on the plan of the Group, it is also possible to detect escalating anger and suspicion on both sides. These sentiments have continued to escalate, exacerbating tensions among political subjects, and have culminated in a critical climax of national government in American public opinion between late 1944 and early 1945, which has caused a great disillusionment at the top of the United States. The analysis of these issues helps to understand the process of the development of American-American relations in times of war and the interaction of the multiple forces behind them. It also helps to see the more specific aspects of historical processes beyond the narratives of political diplomacy. I. The escalation of pre-mergers and contradictions

Since 1943, the military activities of the Communist Party of China in North, China and South China have attracted high official attention in the United States. As early as 1940, George E. Taylor, Deputy Director of the United States Strategic Intelligence Agency for the Pacific region, stated that the united front “is not the true cornerstone of the Communist Party's loyalty to Chongqing, nor its firm belief in defeating Japan”. The Government of the United States, after years of observation, is fully aware of the Chinese Communist Party's enthusiasm and strategic potential. There is a growing consensus in the United States military politics that “the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) has been active on the day, sometimes working with the National Party and, more often, alone”. An increasing number of United States political and military elites are aware of the real strategic value of establishing links with the Communist Party. From 1943 to early 1944, John P. Davies Jr., the Second Secretary of the United States Embassy in China, at the behest of the American Commander Joseph Stillwell of the War Area of China and Myanmar, repeatedly addressed the State Department to send military representatives to North China to establish formal links with the Communist Party. Harry Lloyd Hopkins, Roosevelt's foreign affairs adviser, became a strong supporter of the plan. Before sending the report to the Roosevelt case, he specifically stressed in the additional memo document that “it is of the utmost importance that the military and the Government send the right person to do so”. In order to facilitate the plan as soon as possible, Hopkins was also on the spot in drafting a communication to Chiang Kai-shek. After being persuaded, Roosevelt forwarded the report to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General William Daniel Leahy, for consultation with the Army Chief of Staff, George Catlett Marshall, and the Assistant Army Chief of Staff, Major General Clayton Bissell. Soon, a high-level United States consensus was reached on the plan of the Observer Group. With the unanimous advice of a high level, Roosevelt finally resolved, on 9 February 1944, to formally submit to Chiang Kai-shek a request for the dispatch of an observation team through the Central Myanmar-India field command. The initial difficulties encountered by the United States of America with regard to the dispatch of the observation team and the anger and dissatisfaction with each other in the correspondence between the two sides led the translators to change the wording of the original document when it was translated into one another. This is sometimes due to the carelessness of cultural differences, but more so is the sense of “powder” in the text by translators, who understand that it is impossible to accept the original language at the height of the summit and deliberately to avoid the escalation of the conflict. However, the euphemism of the interpreter had created a illusion on both sides that the situation could be reversed, thus greatly prolonging the process and increasing the cost of communication. When both sides finally realized that consensus could not be reached and that disappointment and divergence had led to great dissatisfaction, both sides believed that the “kindness” that they had had had was merely deliberate delay and hypocrisy. Thus, the bitterness of “translation” becomes “translation” of “danger”. From the outset, Roosevelt was well aware that the observation team ' s plan was difficult for Chiang Kai-shek, so he did not send the message directly to Chiang Kai-shek himself, but instead sent it to Thomas G. Hearn, Chief of Staff in the Central Myanmar-India field. Roosevelt also specifically advised that the information should not be submitted as an official communication, but should be given “in private” to Chiang Kai-shek. Hene then sent Roosevelt's message to Song Jin-Yu, entrusting her to Song Mei-Yu and eventually to Chiang Kai-shek. The contents of the aide-memoire are largely in line with Hopkins's work, with only minor adjustments: “For the time being, our understanding of the enemies of North China and North-East China is extremely lacking. In order to obtain more information and prepare for future ground and air military operations, I consider it essential to send an observer mission to Shaanbei and Shanxi, as well as to other provinces in North China.” In order to highlight the urgency of the plan, Hopkins wrote with a very strong tone: “I am confident that I will receive your full support and cooperation. This great cause is intended to accelerate our defeat of the common enemy and to recover China's lost land.” But Roosevelt, in order to be fully friendly, changed his test phrase to “Can you support and cooperate with this great undertaking?” And when Chiang Kai-shek finally read the message, he asked if he was careful to translate it into a more humble request: “Will you cooperate with the rest of the sponsors?”

The United States has undoubtedly touched the core interests of Chiang Kai-shek by attempting to cross its direct links with the Communist Party. In his view, Roosevelt has been “mixed” by the CPC's propaganda, with the aim of using the CPC to “assist its weapons and to think that it is behind our army”. In spite of deep internal displeasure, Chiang Kai-shek cannot categorically reject the American proposal. He did not reply until 22 February, as did Roosevelt, in order to avoid the inconvenience caused by direct communication, which made it difficult to turn things around, and he instructed Song Mei-Yi to order Chen Brei, Director of the General Military Committee of the National Government, to call Horn in Chen ' s name and forward it to the White House. Chiang Kai-shek stated that he “will be prepared to assist as much as possible” in the observation team's plan. That deliberate rhetoric did not work as he wished. The translation of the original text, the word “involved in difficulty”, was erased and turned into an exaggerated “indulgence to do everything in its power to contribute to your plan”, but the following is the true attitude of Chiang: “It is known that the Ministry of Military Affairs and General Shi's headquarters have prepared such a mission to the political forces of the central Government and to the various locations where the troops of the nation are stationed.” As can be seen, Chiang Kai-shek not only limited the scope of the activities of the United States military representatives to the NCP-dominated areas, but also implied that the national government would also be involved, which amounted to a defunct rejection of the American side’s demands. The interpreter naturally also discovered a Chinese machine, but in order to give full expression to Chiang Kai-shek's cooperation, the sentence was translated into relatively vague: “The Minister of Military Affairs and Military Affairs has been appointed to contact Stevie to discuss the tour route of the visiting mission within the limits of the national government's authority and strength.”

Hen has read the voice of Chiang Kai-shek. He has intimate relations with Stevie, and he hates Chiang Kai-shek as much as the latter. Prior to receiving Chiang's response, Hen sent to the State Council an Explanatory Note on the recent generation of electricity, stating that “the Chinese Government has no genuine will to cooperate with us.” In order to put pressure on Chiang Kai-shek, Hen even recommended “reducing or slowing down military, financial and diplomatic support to China”. In fact, the United States had a very sympathetic understanding of China's request for increased assistance, but Hen had declared that “the relationship between China and China should be built in a pragmatic manner” so as to ensure that the funds received by China were “reciprocally rewarded”. Following a call from Chiang Kai-shek, John S. Service, Second Secretary of the Embassy of the United States of America in China, continued to lobby and senior military and political leaders, such as Marshall, Acting Secretary of State Edward Reilly Stettinius Jr., and Army Minister Henry Lewis Stimson, decided to lobby Roosevelt to facilitate the plan. On 1 March, Roosevelt sent another letter, declaring in irrefutable terms: “North-East China and North-East China are important sources of Japanese military intelligence, and we plan to send a military observer group there shortly”. Unlike before, the message was sent directly to Chiang Kai-shek himself, and in a much stronger formulation. Translators apparently felt that the American side had turned its back on its attitude, and once again, they were “done” not only to significantly weaken the tone, but even to add a false explanation: “If we reach the location of the incident, it will help us to do our best to gather more accurate information in the area”. Moreover, the most crucial message of the original text was that Roosevelt had shown a firm stance, but Chiang Kai-shek still read the words of words: “The travel agreement of the visiting mission has been agreed upon by General Stiftwig with the Minister of Military Affairs and Military Affairs of your country for early implementation.” This translation led Chiang to believe that Roosevelt could “reciprocate” and he did not realize that sending a military observer team was a collective decision of the United States and still believed that it was part of Stevers’ opinion. So he jumped over Roosevelt and instructed Commander Chen to call him on his own behalf, clearly rejecting him. At a time when the National Government had agreed to a visit to Janan by the North-West Visiting Mission of Chinese and foreign journalists, and in order to completely block the Stivie mouth, the message had also specifically emphasized that the press had been allowed to travel because “they came from civil institutions”. He didn't think that Roosevelt himself could not compromise Chiang Kai-shek, whose attitude towards him was even more angry. He transmitted the message to Marshall, claiming that Chiang Kai-shek “was arrogant and almost offensive”. He reminded Marshall that “the long-standing political struggle of the Communist Party has severely weakened China's resistance, which the United States should focus on in China. ... in order to reverse the current situation, it is imperative that the military claims of the United States forces in North China be put on the agenda as soon as possible and that the Observer Group carry out its tasks as it wishes.” At the same time, Stewy stressed that “if the Observer Group were to follow the national Government's path, it would be impossible for the United States to speak of any mission they wished to accomplish”. In view of the military significance of the Group, Sting generated a focused lobby. He was given the opportunity to “assist the United States Air Force in guerrilla and Japanese-occupied areas and rescue pilots, as well as to study the possibility of using the communist guerrilla method in ground operations”. He knew that Roosevelt was the only one who could really make the team plan. He contacted Secretary of State Cordell Hull through the United States Ambassador to China, Clarence Edward Gauss, in the hope that the latter would persuade Roosevelt to pressure Chiang Kai-shek in a stronger position. At the same time, Stifler reworked the message to Chiang Kai-shek, following Hopkins' example. On 4 April, Hel sent a memorandum to Roosevelt conveying the recommendations of Stever. To impress Roosevelt, Helm specifically stated that it was his consensus with Stimson, Goss and Stever. Roosevelt said yes on the spot, but Hull and Stimson waited for days without a trace, so the two men privately instructed Stevie and Goss to put pressure on Chiang Kai-shek, if necessary by substantial means. It was just when the United States considered Chiang Kai-shek to be delaying the procrastination that Chiang Kai-shek also considered the United States to be a traitor. His displeasure stems first and foremost from Roosevelt's refusal to uphold justice during the Central-Soviet border crisis at this time. From March to April 1944, the Soviet Union bombarded Xinjiang on several occasions and re-engaged in foreign Mongolia. Chiang Kai-shek is anxious and writes in his diary: “In addition to Russia's violent aggressions, the Russians want to make a big deal out of it.” He sent a series of messages to the White House in the hope that the United States would stop it and that his words would come to an end. However, Roosevelt, after repeated requests by Chiang Kai-shek, persuaded him to “cool” and “do not undermine the unity of the Allies and the unity of our common struggle against the sun” as a result of the events in Monsikang outside. Roosevelt even declared that “restraint and good will will dispel misunderstandings between allies”. From the American perspective, this apathy is based on realism and they are reluctant to stimulate the Soviet Union. For China, however, there is a clear double standard. Jiang Kai-shek, who is disappointed, continues to ask Roosevelt to “do whatever is possible to make it possible for the remaining extreme prudence to be effectively assisted”. At the same time, the differences between China and the United States over Myanmar's counter-offensive plan cast a shadow over relations between the two sides. Roosevelt hoped that China's expeditions would be restored and the dragons and that they would enter Myanmar to fight. However, as the Japanese army has deployed heavy troops to Rakhine, Mengkang and Chindung River, it will face a heavy battle when the expedition begins. On 3 April 1944, according to the unstoppable Roosevelt commanding Horn to call Chiang Kai-shek, a single knife went in and said: “I can't stand the Y Regiment (China Expedition — Invocator) sitting around with American-style equipment.” Roosevelt also wrote in the words of reprimand: “In the past few years, we have armed and trained the Y Regiment and have made great efforts to bring in equipment and rations. They can't go to war right now. What's the point of our efforts?" In this regard, Chiang Kai-shek wrote in his diary: “The late pick-up of Roosevelt forced me to attack the Tenron with Fancy's army, during which `We equip and train your army' ... We fly weapons and supply instructors by air, in order to make no sense' and `ununderstood' the language of bullying, the meaning of which is obvious.”

Even more disturbing is the fact that Roosevelt is aware of the heavy responsibilities of the military expedition but has ignored China’s request to increase its weapons and military spending. On behalf of Chiang Kai-shek, who came to the United States to negotiate with him in a desperate state of emergency, he also made numerous calls to Stevie, Marshall and Hen, hoping that they would “comfort more” in the allocation of renting goods, but none of them were able to meet expectations. The United States, which wanted China to fight, was reluctant to provide sufficient weapons and had repeatedly resorted to cutting or even withdrawing aid. Chiang Kai-shek's anger was too great to be done, and in his diary he rebuffed: “There is no political common sense in the United States military, but only the material and the weapons.”

At this point, Chiang Kai-shek finally realized that Roosevelt was not merely “inflicted” by Stevie and others, and that it was his intention to be tough on China. The hatred of Stifler rose to the point of resentment towards Roosevelt, especially after receiving a message from Roosevelt urging troops, and Jiang's discontent reached its peak, arguing that Roosevelt had “pressed me to bow to each other while he was on fire and at a time when the Soviet Union was crushing his territory for the Japanese. The angry Chiang Kai-shek instructed Ambassador Wei Domin to do his utmost to reverse the attitude of the United States at the top. At the end of April and the beginning of May, Wei Daw Minh met with Hull and John Carter Vincent, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United States Department of State for the Far East, in an effort to discredit the CCP ' s contribution to the war. Wei Dominy suggested that the United States plan to send a military observer team to North China was “very unwise and unconsidered”. For their part, Van Seinde believes that it is necessary for the United States military to become familiar with the situation in North China, as they “are likely to fight here”. But Wei had avoided talking about it and accused the United States of having a lack of understanding of the national Government but of being sympathetic to the Communist Party. The talks did not go well, and Van Sender presented the minutes of the talks to the United States Department of State. The refusal of Chiang Kai-shek to cooperate and the fact that Wei Do Ming spoke to him in his right or in his right or in the right direction immediately ignited the fury of the United States. A few months ago, when Davis proposed to abandon Chiang Kai-shek, few respondents responded. At this point, however, an increasing number of United States politicians are beginning to reconsider this proposal, which is represented by Oliver Edmund Clubb, an expert in China and Russia at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Far East. On 19 May, Kolobo presented to the Far East Division a report entitled “United States Policy on Central-Soviet Relations”. On the face of it, it is a matter of discussion, but it is not. “The United States fought alongside China and fought against Japan, but this does not mean that the United States will support the national Government unconditionally”. He stressed that “the greatest concern of the United States Government is now to win. Any member of an ally should adjust its policies with a view to achieving its common goal — the destruction of fascist countries and the re-establishment of world order. In this new order, people are more concerned with humanity than with power dictatorship.” The report drew the attention of Joseph W. Ballantine, Director of the Far East Department, who immediately presented himself to Herr. The abandonment of Chiang Kai-shek and the shift to other political groups, if necessary, is one of the ideas of the United States high-level policy towards China at this stage. Driven by this mentality, the attitude of the United States Government towards Chiang Kai-shek has grown stronger and the discontent between the two sides has intensified. II. A compromise between Wallace and Chiang Kai-shek

On 7 March 1944, Roosevelt sent a note to Wallace in the hope that he would visit China via the Soviet Union in order to advance the plan of the Observer Group. Upon receipt of the instructions, Wallace consulted with Hull on the selection of his co-chairman, who, inter alia, suggested that the persons concerned needed “to be fluent in Chinese and familiar with Chinese affairs, preferably working in China in the near future, and to understand China's current situation; to know Chinese politicians, understand their style of conduct and provide valuable advice”. Following a consultation with Roosevelt, Hull appointed Owen Lattimore, a leading Han scientist, as accompanying Commissioner. They all held important positions in the United States diplomatic and consular posts in China or in the national government, and had a certain knowledge of Chinese political culture and of Chiang Kai-shek ' s character. Latimer, a former political adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, sympathizes with China ' s resistance, which has been well publicized in many international forums for its strategic significance. It was their participation that made breakthrough progress in the negotiations. To demonstrate the importance of Wallace's visit to China, Roosevelt suggested that he would act as his “private representative” and collect first-hand information for the President and the American people. As Wallace would visit the Soviet Union first, Chiang Kai-shek feared that the US-Soviet would reach a private agreement. In order to dispel his doubts, Wallace did not go to Moscow, but to Almaty (the first largest city in Kazakhstan today) and Tashkent (the capital of Uzbekistan today) to visit the collective farms there. On 20 June, after the end of the Central Asian tour, Wallace flew to Chongqing for Dilification (Urumqi today). Owing to the harsh weather conditions, their group stayed at Chengdu airport for two hours. It was here that the United States bombers took off with a heavy blow to the Japanese military base, the last round of which took place days before their arrival. In the summer of 1941, the United States writer Ernest Miller Hemingway visited the Chinese rear and reported in detail on the construction of Chengdu Airport. In the United States, the efforts of Sichuan people to build the airport, under extremely poor conditions, almost exclusively by their manpower, have sparked a boom. The United States Government had high expectations of the strategic effectiveness of Chengdu Airport, but three years later, Wallace had found that, despite the high level of ambition of the United States aviation fleet, restrictions had significantly reduced the power of the air strikes. United States military pilots complain that they “can't access information on the weather in North China and the movements of the Japanese, while their military situation is often revealed”. The meeting at Chengdu airport made it imperative for Wallace to convince Chiang Kai-shek to agree to the plan. During the next two days, Chiang conducted five rounds of negotiations, with representatives of both sides speaking out. Despite the multiplicity of issues, all the clues point to the core of inter-State relations. Chiang Kai-shek has long lost confidence in the United States and, in his view, “the so-called covenants and oaths are used by the might”. In order to restore the confidence of Chiang Kai-shek in order to move the negotiations forward, Wallace, in accordance with Roosevelt's instructions, emphasized that the United States stood up for China's international status as one of the four Powers. The participation of the major Powers in the post-war re-establishment of the world order is the wish of Chiang Kai-shek. In his telegram to Roosevelt, he stated: “China is one of the first advocates of the post-war peace organization, whose humanity would be diminished without the participation of the Asian nation.” The promise of Wallace has eased Chiang Kai-shek's attitude, and both sides have finally moved on to the specific issue of sending an observer team. The original “carrots” had worked, and Wallace had taken the “big stick” with great insinuity. At that point, the sand fell, and the Japanese forces went straight to the sun. With all due respect, Wallace has made an unwelcome statement that the United States is dissatisfied with the National Party's military defeat. He sacrificed the FDR flag, stating that the President wanted Chiang Kai-shek to set aside his differences with the CPC. Wallace was not aware that, when Chiang Kai-shek convened a high-level consultation on 18 June, he had intended to make a modest concession, “associated with the United States to Janan”, to be used exclusively for relief purposes in the field “in the event of a forced landing of an American pilot, while an informal military delegation”. Chiang Kai-shemoto concluded that the observation team's plan was “to use the Communist Party to hold me hostage” by the United States Government, at a time when Wallace's pressure triggered a massive backlash, and he refused to answer all the observation team's questions and implicitly vowed to “do what I do”. Wallace did not think that the situation would be completely out of control, and he was disappointed, complaining in his diary about Chiang Kai-shek's “short-sightedness” and “speeching in his words against the Communist Party”. In his report to Roosevelt, Wallace also lamented: “Chang Kai-shek is extremely biased against the Communist Party. Such a deep-seated desire for a satisfactory and truly implementable agreement in the negotiations seems very remote.” The unsuspecting Wallace calls to Van Xander for a response. Fan Xingde is the best “China-wide” and he has grasped the biggest depression in Chiang Kai-shek — fearing that the United States will use this opportunity to force the country to reach a compromise. Van Seonde proposed to avoid a common dispute and to head for the specific goal of the United States, “to send military intelligence personnel to North China, including the territory controlled by the Communist Party”. On 23 June, at 9 a.m., the United States and China resumed negotiations. In keeping with the recommendations of Van Xant, Wallace stated that the United States “has no interest” in the CPC and that “the real concern is only the progress of the war”. He conveyed to Chiang Kai-shek the complaints of Chengdu airport pilots, stating that “as you have been so anxious to negotiate with the Chinese Communist Party, we are also facing the difficulty of gathering intelligence from North China”. He suggested that Chiang Kai-shek should distinguish between “conciliation with the Communist Party of China” and “allowing U.S. military representatives to travel to North China” and “they would have been something different”. As a matter of fact, Chiang Kai-shek's attitude was clearly abated, and he suggested: “The Group does not have to wait for an agreement between the States, but is ready to leave as long as it is ready. The negotiations have finally turned the corner. Fan Xingdee believes that Chiang Kai-shek is also concerned that the Soviet Union has also taken the opportunity to request representatives to travel to North China. With a view to bringing Chiang Kai-shek down once and for all, he promised that the United States would stop the Soviet Union. After receiving a double undertaking from the United States side, Chiang Kai-shek finally gave up, “consenting the United States military observer team to travel to the territory controlled by the Communist Party of North China”. At a time when Wallace thought that the work had been accomplished, Chiang Kai-shek put forward two additional conditions: first, that the Observer Group must be under the direct authority of the Military Commission of the National Government (hereinafter referred to as the Military Commission); and second, that it must be accompanied by members of the National Party. At the same time, Chiang Kai-shek accused the United States Government of always calling for a common understanding, without ever putting any pressure on the Communist Party. He stressed that the United States should understand the importance of “unified leadership” and even suggested that the United States should urge the Communist Party to comply with the National Government, that the armed forces of the Communist Party should be integrated into the army of the Government, and that the control of the Communist Party should fall under the control of the National Government. Such a statement by the United States would undoubtedly trigger Soviet suspicion. Wallace therefore immediately refused and reminded Chiang Kai-shek that the national Government must first reconcile with the Soviet Union, without which no agreement with the Communist Party would be guaranteed. That is the true attitude of the United States of America, compared to the false promises made before. The swift reversal of Wallace's attitude has caused Chiang Kai-shek to fall short, and the Chinese-Soviet relationship is making him look like he could not at the same time offend the United States. On 23 June, at 11 a.m., the negotiations were adjourned. Wallace et al. met with Goss in the margins and decided to ask Roosevelt again for help. Roosevelt returned shortly and issued the latest order — the addition of Benjamin G. Ferris, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Central Myanmar-India War Area, to join the negotiations. At 5 p.m. on the same day, Ferris was escorted by Sheves, and two came on behalf of Stevie. The latest Roosevelt telegram was read out in public. Roosevelt laid the bottom line on Chiang Kai-shek: “On April 1st, the U.S. government began preparations with the Embassy to send an observation team!” Roosevelt responded so strongly because he had recently received a tip from his Administrative Assistant, Lauchlin Currie. Curie told Roosevelt that “the national reconciliation is a dead end, and the National Party has no intention of making any compromise and making a negotiating stance just in response to external criticism”. Roosevelt was outraged, and immediately after receiving a request for help from Wallace and others, he called back to emphasize the unremitting attitude of the United States. For Chiang Kai-shek, the message is almost “a pitiful dagger”. The previous communications between the two sides, albeit in the shadows, were carefully maintained in dignity, and at this point they were completely breached and Chiang Kai-shek was deeply unable to continue to counterbalance. Thus, when Fan Xingdee confirmed his attitude, Chiang Kai-shek finally agreed to send a military observer team. The parties then began to communicate on the details. This round of negotiations was represented by Ferris on behalf of the United States. Ferris is better at negotiating than Wallace. His demands were rounded up, his consensus was confirmed with determination, and he created an aggressive sense of pressure, leaving no room for hesitation. However, after months of encounters, Chiang Kai-shek became self-obsessed, rather than being highly intelligent. On the afternoon of 23 June, he agreed to all requests from the United States. Ferris demanded that Chiang Kai-shek give the Observer Group full freedom, such as the use of radio to transmit information to facilitate the efficient movement of the aviation fleet. Chiang Kai-shek replied that the team could take the radio station and Ferris promised that any enemy intelligence gathered would be shared with the Military Commission. Subsequently, the parties addressed the most critical aspects of the route. According to Ferris: “The vast territory of North China is so vast and complex that it would be very difficult to move in strict compliance with pre-established routes.” Chiang Kai-shek agreed. In the run-up, Ferris proposed that the Military Commission should not be accompanied by members, and suggested that the freedom of activity of the Observer Group should be increased: “The activities of the Observer Group would not necessarily be uniform, but would be fragmented and would carry out different observation and intelligence-gathering tasks”. Chiang Kai-shek also made concessions to allow “observers to enjoy absolute freedom of movement” and to inform him of how he could negotiate specifically with the Chief of Staff of the Military Commission. Ferris was concerned about the future and asked Chiang Kai-shek to give a note in advance. On the spot, Chiang Kai-shek promised Ferris that he would meet with him on 24 June at 5 p.m. and that he would answer to him. Ferris added that the observation team would be composed of some 20 officers, and Chiang Kai-shek responded “acceptable”. Following this round of negotiations, the disadvantages that had previously impeded the plan of the Observer Group were excluded. At this point, there was a sudden episode in which Chiang Kai-shek stated that he had only one other requirement, that the United States observers must be under the “direction” of the Military Commission. He also stressed that the national Government could only commit itself “to grant absolute freedom to the Observer Group under the control of the National Government”, but that the United States itself was required to intervene with regard to the movement within the territory of the CPC. In the English official communication, the word “directive” was initially translated as “Auspice”, meaning “support” or “asylum”. Wallace and Ferris expressed deep misgivings, which they feared meant that Chiang Kai-shek still did not give the Observer Group full freedom. At a critical juncture, Latimer and Shervis played an important role in the Chinese language. Latimer explained: “According to the Chinese rhetorical logic, this means that the Commissioner has agreed to grant the Observer Group complete and absolute freedom of movement.” Shewes suggested that, in reporting to Roosevelt, the term could be translated as a softer “Sponsorship”, meaning “significance” or “sponsorship”, in order to avoid misunderstanding at the top of the United States. On the issue of team naming, Chiang Kai-shek strongly rejected the word “mission” in Roosevelt's telegram and the Chinese Communist Party strongly opposed the “visit mission” proposed by Chiang Kai-shek. In the end, Song Mei-Yu proposed the use of the United States Military Observer Group (U.S. Army Investment Section), a name that had been jointly endorsed by the three parties. These details suggest that, for Chiang Kai-shek, the observation of the formations is overwhelming and only a little dignity can be recovered from diplomatic rhetoric. As Wallace wrote in his report, Chiang Kai-shek “has maintained his good faith despite his difficulties”. The negotiations won a great deal. “The United States Army has been permitted by the National Government to send officers to visit various parts of North China.” At the same time, Ferris stressed that United States military representatives would be “directed” by the Military Commission. So, after almost six months of a saw-and-fight, the United States finally got what it wanted. On 22 July and 7 August, two groups of United States military observers arrived in Yan An from Chongqing. III. Trade-offs and considerations behind Chiang Kai-shek’s compromise

The attitude of Chiang Kai-shek towards the plan of the observation team has changed several times. His eventual compromise was multi-purpose, including a trade-off of the international situation and a much deeper struggle. At the national level, Japan’s military situation, British exclusion, Soviet aggression, US coercion, Japanese-Soviet contacts, US-Soviet compromise, all of which have caused Chiang Kai-shek to feel “involved, and inexhaustible” and, at the individual level, the challenges of his own party, as well as the contradictions with US military officials in China, such as Stivie, Goss, and others. To a large extent, it was the situation of internal distress that prompted Chiang Kai-shek to accept the team’s plan as a “life-saving” to break the crisis. During the fighting, Chiang Kai-shek ' s desire to improve China ' s international standing through diplomatic activity was repeatedly suppressed by the United Kingdom. Fearing that China ' s national liberation would inspire the Asian independence movement, Britain had always questioned China ' s status as a major Power. In 1940, the Japanese army broke the law in India. The national government had thought that the United Kingdom would realize that “the policy of appeasement in East Asia is not working as intended” and that it would change its attitude towards China in the light of the international situation, but it did not. After the Chinese expeditions launched their offensives, the British were rescued in the field of war on several occasions, but Churchill's attitude remained strong and even openly stated that raising China's status was “unbelievable”. At the Cairo Conference in 1943, Chiang Kai-shek proposed to Roosevelt that China and the United States should support the independence of South-East Asian countries, which is even more so in Churchill's nerves. Once again, he tried to convince Roosevelt to squeeze China out of the Quad countries. For Chiang Kai-shek, greater pressure came from the Soviet Union. The National Government had originally considered the Soviet Union “the main force in the world anti-aggression movement, the pillar of the Peace Front”. In 1939, during his mobilization speech to the Military Commission's field staff training course for field staff of the Military Orders Department, the Minister for Central Communication of the National Party stressed that the Soviet Union, as a “peace-loving country”, was China's “reliable best friend”. In the spring of 1944, however, the Soviet Union ' s violations of China ' s borders completely shattered that expectation. In the face of the Soviet Union's “era of violence”, Chiang Kai-shek has no choice but to “restraint himself” and fear that once the conflict has escalated, China “will be in danger without any foreign assistance”. He wrote in his diary: “Such evil means and their conspiracies can only be done by Russia. No other aggressor country can imagine such a design.” After May 1944, the Japanese army advanced “Operation One” and redeployed a large number of troops from north-east China to defend and control the Soviet Union. At the same time, the Soviet Union recalled its Military Adviser in China and extended the North Kumashima Fisheries Agreement with Japan. Jiang Kai-shek is even more afraid of “this is a clear proof of complete security in Japan and Russia”. As the United States Observer Group plans to play the game, it is at a time when Chiang Kai-shek is struggling with military defeat, economic depression and political crisis. In his diary, he lamented: “The Russians and the British have constantly insulted me, and the United States has been subjected to oppression for two and a half years, the worst of pain and suffering.” In May 1944, his “pity” towards the United States had not diminished, but had to a large extent been replaced by an alternative. The situation of internal diplomacy has caused him to feel his position is in a state of shock, and rumours of the high-ranking United States of America abandoning himself have also been heard. He was further disturbed by the close exchanges between US diplomats such as Davids and Zhou Enlai, the Nationalist Councillor Sunko and others during this period. Chiang Kai-shek fears that the U.S., the Chinese Communist Party (CPC), and the parties will agree to “mix internal and external threats and plan to overthrow the government”. Chiang Kai-shek, while eager to get out of United States control, cannot stand up to it because of his dependence on the United States. So, the “results and losses” became his consistent mindset of American diplomacy. When the parties first engaged in a confrontation around the observation team's plan, Chiang Kai-shek was upset by the difficulty of grasping his attitude: “The heart is sad and heated, and the general sense of American diplomacy is too straight and too hard”. This mentality has been with him, causing him to feel as thin as ice, and to fear that “one wrong word, one wrong line, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, and one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, one wrong, and one wrong, one, one wrong. The constant pressure from the US side has heightened the fear that Chiang Kai-shek will completely lose America. Long after the Casablanca conference, Chiang Kai-shek was dissatisfied with Roosevelt, arguing that the United States “sacrifices China only”, but also that “there is no better way than for US-US policy”. In that spirit, Chiang Kai-shek warned himself that there was no need to overestimate American diplomacy and that “it was important not to forget to use its might”. The paradox, however, is that, although Chiang Kai-shek is well aware that “diplomatic diplomacy has nothing to say by virtue of its strength”, he is still “disturbed and discomforted” by “involved in United States diplomacy” and even “disturbed by his personal feelings or loss”. Of all the demands made against the United States, Chiang Kai-shek would most like the United States to mediate negotiations between China and the Sudan. Chiang Kai-shek fears that the United States will agree with the Soviet Union and the Communist Party, and that the United States will be able to grasp this. Ross welfare uses the Central-Soviet conflict to bind each other on both sides, thus achieving its own Far East strategic goals: It is important not only to prevent Soviet forces from permeating China, but also to induce Chiang Kai-shek to compromise on the CCP issue. Thus, before Wallace left, Roosevelt ordered the United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union to tell Stalin: “Chang Kai-shek is currently the only person who can maintain China's unity, and his regime should not be subverted. If China breaks apart and civil war breaks out, it will no longer be able to fight effectively.” He asked Stalin “to be patient and agree with Chiang Kai-shek and the Communist Party of China”. Meanwhile, Roosevelt put more pressure on Chiang Kai-shek. He instructed Wallace to convey his warning that the United States had done its best to obtain Soviet support for Chiang Kai-shek, but that “the United States could not guarantee that the Soviet Union would not behave excessively” if the commonwealth dispute could not be resolved as soon as possible. And once the Soviet Union intervenes, “it is likely that North-East China and North-East China will be divided, and the national Government may lose the land completely”. When Wallace threw that statement at the negotiating table, there was no doubt that Chiang Kai-shek was sitting on a needle, and that he feared more than that. In addition to the concerns of the Soviet Union, Chiang Kai-shek's contacts with Japan and the Soviet Union have become even more difficult, considering them “the only future national tragedy”. Following the conclusion of the negotiations, he had a private meeting with Wallace, first to talk about his friendship with Roosevelt and then to throw out his real intentions - in the hope that the United States would “facilitate a meeting between China, Russia or China, Russia and the United States”. In a hurry, Chiang Kai-shek even said that, as long as the United States mediated from it, it was “the wish of China in any way”. In addition to the desire for United States support at the strategic level, Chiang Kai-shek needs to address immediate needs — greater access to war loans and economic assistance. When Chiang Kai-shek visited the Gui Lin front in February 1944, he had commissioned Song Mei-Yo to call Roosevelt to propose that the United States appoint a Commissioner to China to “co-business programme” to solve China's economic and financial problems. In order to attract Roosevelt's attention, Chiang Kai-shek said: “If the loan fails to materialize, it will seriously undermine our national civil-military resistance.” But he waited for more than a month, and Roosevelt failed. Chiang Kai-shek wrote with indignation: “The United States has not only imposed severe restrictions on my supply, but has also imposed colonial measures on me. With shame and indignity, pain cannot be named.” After mid-April, the Chinese military situation deteriorated dramatically, and Chiang Kai-shek was desperate, causing the business community to fly to the United States to negotiate the expansion of support. In order to secure the financial support of the United States, Chiang Kai-shek had to compromise on the long-standing Myanmar counter-offensive, dispatching excursions to cross the rivers of anger and to storm and storm the dragons. On 13 May 1944, Chiang Kai-shek called Roosevelt again, describing the difficult situation in China ' s double-line combat and requesting additional material assistance from the United States. Roosevelt was unsettled and he sent letters asking about the United States Department of the Army and the Department of the Treasury. This is when Chiang Kai-shek strongly resisted the team ' s plan, which the United States seniors saw as a major leverage to force him to compromise. Stimson was the first to suffer, and on 19 May he presented a six-page report to Roosevelt on the decline of the national government economy. A week later, Stimson went to Roosevelt again, reiterating that the United States Government could not promise Chiang Kai-shek. His reason was that China was experiencing very high inflation, a very high exchange rate and still a possibility of soaring, which could seriously affect the United States military plan. Stimson concluded by stressing that “the representatives of the United States cannot make any commitment to Chongqing until they have obtained the approval of the Treasury and your consent”. On 8 June, United States Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau Jr. also launched an “assist”, presenting Central American exchange rate data since August 1942. Between December 1943 and February 1944 alone, the exchange rate tripled. Roosevelt was appalled by the fact that he accepted the two views and declined China ' s request for reinforcement. Chiang Kai-shek lost hope and could not bear the consequences of losing United States aid. Thus, on the afternoon of the day when the observation team agreed on its plan, Chiang Kai-shek immediately moved the subject to the Chinese-American economic cooperation. In addition, Chiang Kai-shek has a much more invisible mind: to drive out Stifler and goth with him. Since May 1944, he has been considering the replacement of two candidates. Chiang Kai-shek has always been impressed by Claire Lee Chennault, the head of the Chinese Air Force's United States Air Force Volunteer Corps, but unfortunately Chan Na Nadu has “no power but very limited power”. The negotiations on the observation team provided an opportunity for Chiang Kai-shek, who decided to give up for the time being in exchange for offering Roosevelt leverage to replace the two. In the afternoon of 24 June, Wallace flew from Chongqing to Kunming. When he was sent away, Chiang Kai-shek entrusted Song Mei-Yo with the task of conveying his 12 points, 11 of which were empty diplomatic rhetoric, with the last of the core — the replacement of Stevie. Chiang Kai-shek wrote, in a speech without room for manoeuvre, that “it is difficult for China and the United States to develop closer military cooperation because of personnel problems”. Citing the example of General Adrian Carton de Wiart, who is responsible for the Far East in the United Kingdom in China, Chiang Kai-shek asked whether Roosevelt could appoint a representative of the same nature with full authority over military and political matters, and stated that “this person will play a very valuable role”. On the question of candidates, Chiang Kai-shek recommended Chen Nadu, who was “very cooperative”. In fact, his preference for Chenald was not only because it was “especially good for China”, but also because it was “very good at obeying”. Chiang Kai-shek had hoped to buy US support in exchange for concessions on the team’s plan, but, sadly, all his aspirations had failed. The United States had not increased its military spending or assistance, and he had been disappointed by the treatment of Soviet issues. In the follow-up negotiations, Wallace again abandoned China's sovereignty, claiming that “the Soviet Union wanted only an unfrozen port”. Jiang Kai-shek certainly would not believe this guile, but there is no other way. One group has finalized its plan, leaving no room for retrogression; the other is concerned that failure to comply with the Soviet conditions would lead to more serious reprisals. After all that had happened, Chiang Kai-shek had to say that the Soviet Union had been allowed to use the two ports in Dalian after the war, “provided that the Soviet Union respected China's sovereignty and cooperated with China in the Far East”. As can be seen, the United States has been pressuring its national government to sell to the Soviet Union under Chinese sovereignty, using inexplicable options. This naked chauvinism goes beyond Chiang Kai-shek's expectations. It's just that Chiang Kai-shek is still in the back. The difficult negotiations on the Observer Group have long exhausted Roosevelt's patience, as has the political, military and socio-economic crisis in the front battlefield and in the rear, and the loss of confidence in the Nationalist regime. Instead of being immediately removed, Stevie almost really took over Chiang Kai-shek's military command. On 6 July 1944, Roosevelt personally called Chiang Kai-shek, who not only categorically refused to reassign the Representative, but also urged Chiang Kai-shek to immediately recall him from the front line of Myanmar to Chongqing, “whoever military strength exists in both China and the United States, with full authority over the Japanese army”. Roosevelt's emphasis on “all forces”, while usurping Chiang Kai-shek's military command, also acquiesced to the request of St.dwig to absorb the Chinese Communist Party. As a result, Chiang Kai-shek hopes that all resources exchanged through compromise will be lost. For him, however, the real crisis is much more than that. This period of military desolation, human misery and political depravity have caused the United States to feel a great disillusionment with the national Government, while the hard-earned-and-heavy fighting around the deployment of the YAN Watch Group has led to a total outbreak of resentment on the part of senior United States officials against Chiang Kai-shek himself. By the summer of 1944, cutting, if necessary, with Chiang Kai-shek in support of other political forces has been the subject of extensive discussions at the top of the United States. The United States strategy against China is being transformed. Conclusion

The complex emotional elements behind the history process should be given attention to the psychological and emotional aspects of people as subjects of history, whether individuals or groups. When history fades, the text becomes ephemeral, and once subjective feelings become objective. If researchers are able to share the feelings of those who experience the Earth, they can understand in greater depth their contradictions and anxiety in the course of history. For the United States, the dispatch of the Janan Military Observer Group has multiple considerations, in addition to fighting for the Communist Party of China (CPC), which are more cynical about the infiltration of Soviet forces, concerns about the deterioration of inter-state relations, and trade-offs with China’s political changes. In the negotiations surrounding the observation team ' s plan, Chiang Kai-shek ' s refusal to cooperate provoked anger at the top of the United States. During the same period, tensions between Chiang Kai-shek and Stilwe over military command, United States good offices relations between Central Sudan and the United States aid deal led to further deterioration of relations between the two sides. Wallace’s visit to China was intended to save the deterioration of Chiang’s relationship, but he made a commitment to the negotiations while he stepped in and put enormous pressure on Chiang Kai-shek. The final compromise of Chiang Kai-shek was not an understanding of the strategic value of United States cooperation with the Communist Party of China, but a compromise under difficult circumstances. In the spring and summer of 1944, Chiang Kai-shek repeatedly used the expression “silent” in his diary, “silent” and “distressed” and even lamented that he was “smeared and ashamed and felt unspoken”. It can be said that he treated the United States as a life-saving straw in a spirit of total ashes. Chiang Kai-shek had hoped to trade for political, economic and military support from the United States through the acceptance of the Group’s plan, but that was not the case. Although Chiang Kai-shek understood that the root causes of “the poverty of today” were political and social instability and “the failure of the military festival”, he had derisioned another cause as “intransigent with Roosevelt”. This shows that beyond political, military and economic factors, emotions are also an important driving force in Central American diplomacy. For Chiang Kai-shek, the sense of contradiction and disorder has led him to lose his sense of reason when he was in American diplomacy, into emotional and inexhaustible embarrassment and, ultimately, to be unable to move on. This is a personal failure of Chiang Kai-shek and a failure of the diplomatic service of the national Government. Behind the emotions, what is hidden is the rivalry of national power. Only the solid support of the combined power of the State will be the fundamental building block for winning the international initiative of respect and control of destiny.