The most dramatic day since the temporary truce in the Americas

On 1 June, the most dramatic day has passed since the United States-Iraq temporary ceasefire.

First, the United States “defensively” attacked Iran, and after its counter-attack against the United States military bases in the region, it continued to bomb Israel in Lebanon, calling for the withdrawal of the inhabitants of southern Lebanon. This has been interpreted by Arab media, such as the Lebanese StepNet, as follows: Israel will carry out Gaza-style carpet bombing of Lebanon and will bomb the Lebanese capital, Beirut.

The southern suburbs of Beirut after the attack (information)

Subsequently, the United States media Axios News Network quoted an explosion by an anonymous United States official, in which United States President Trump called Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu to make a big speech. Trump said Netanyahu would have gone to prison long ago had it not been for him. The media also reported that Trump had stated that everyone hated Israel. East Watch journalists in the Middle East noted that the media in the Arab world had heavily covered the explosive conversations between Trump and Netanyahu, and that the Egyptians of Today had referred directly to Trump as “everyone hates Israel”.

On April 7, 2025, President Trump welcomed Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu to the White House in Washington.

This, according to many media, highlights the rare differences between the United States and Israel. Media outlets such as Al Jazeera also continued to show the fragility of the US-Iraq ceasefire, as there was no Israel at the negotiating table, but Israel did hold the war button that broke the ceasefire.

Look at the journalist: Zhang Shuyi

Previous reports

On 19 May, United States President Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu made a “long and difficult” telephone call, and it was clear that they were moving towards a different front for Iran.

This disagreement is not just a “talking” or a “playing” tactical trade-off, but also a re-clearing of the structural cracks within the American-Israeli alliance.

This figure shows Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu.

Why the “controversial”

This call was preceded by a “hot-up” on both sides.

During his call, Trump told Netanyahu that he might advance a new round of targeted strikes against Iran earlier this week. But only 24 hours later, he changed his words to " at the request of the Gulf allies " , suspending the 19-day strike and giving the negotiations another chance.

The “brake” of this foot became a direct trigger for America's differences.

On 19 January, Trump again called Netanyahu and informed the latter that the facilitator was promoting a new version of the memorandum of peace in an attempt to bridge the differences between the United States and Iraq and open a one-month negotiating window; he was prepared to leave “limited time” for diplomacy. Netanyahu, for his part, was unequivocally opposed to the postponement of the strike, which was a mistake and called on the United States to resume military operations.

According to a number of informed sources, the call lasted for an hour and the atmosphere was “hard” and the two had different views on the ceasefire negotiations, and Netanyahu had “fast on fire” after his call.

On 20 December, the two men ' s public statements were even worse.

Trump told the media that he and Netanyahu were in agreement with Iraq, “he was a very good man and he would do what I told him”. Netanyahu has taken a strong stand: Iran ' s nuclear capability is Israel ' s greatest threat, and Israel will not accept it if the nuclear agreement does not include the removal of 60 per cent of the enriched uranium out of Iran and the dismantling or destruction of all Iranian nuclear facilities.

Netanyahu reportedly convened the Security Cabinet for two consecutive nights in preparation for the resumption of military operations against Iraq. He concluded that the objectives of the war had not been achieved and that Iran had not been “structurally weakened”.

The end line is different.

This is not the first time that America has fought over Iran.

During the negotiations on the Iraqi nuclear deal in 2015, Netanyahu addressed the United States Congress, openly opposing the agreement promoted by the Obama administration. When the agreement was reached, Netanyahu denounced it as “historic error”.

Since Trump came to power again, Netanyahu has been a symbol of close ties, and the United States does have a common interest in Iran: it does not accept Iran ' s possession of nuclear weapons, it wants to weaken its missile, drone threat and proxy network, and it continues to pressure Tehran.

As the fighting progressed, however, the “terminal line” between the two sides went wrong.

On the nuclear issue, Israel has long insisted on “the total elimination of Iran's nuclear capabilities”; the United States prefers “restriction and delay”, because “complete removal” faces enormous obstacles at both the technical and political levels.

In terms of cost considerations, the United States, as a global hegemony, has multiple interests in the Middle East and does not want the conflict to be prolonged, preferring to negotiate a “disconnectable” outcome: the opening of straits, lower oil prices, a halt to war; and Israel's heightened security anxiety, not “Iran's commitment”, but “Iran's incompetence”.

At the domestic political level, American politicians have focused on the electoral cycle, and as the medium-term elections approach, oil prices and inflationary pressures have hit the basics of the Trump regime, prompting them to seek a cooler on Iraq’s issues; but for Netanyahu, hard-line is both a need for Israel’s survival and a key to his strategy of “consolidating power through external conflict.” Once the United States of America is eased, Netanyahu’s foundation of government and Israel’s national strategy will be affected.

“asymmetric intimacy”

There was not no friction between Trump and Netanyahu.

In March, Trump told the media that ending the war against Iraq was a “joint decision”. However, a few weeks later, when the interim ceasefire agreement was reached, Israel was allegedly caught by surprise and completely absent from the negotiations.

This telephone dispute is actually the same question: who decides when the war ends? Washington or Jerusalem?

In the short term, Netanyahu had difficulty in openly confronting the strategic decisions of the United States, but could continue to lobby, induce and even seek interviews.

According to sources, Netanyahu intends to visit the United States in the coming weeks with a clear purpose: Lifting the threshold of the agreement, requiring stronger nuclear commitments, slower release of funds, and the issue of Iranian agents cannot be set aside.

In the medium term, the United States may continue to resort to “two-handed repression”: one-handed negotiation, one-hand military threat.

In the long run, despite deep differences, relations between America and Israel cannot break down.

This is Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu (left) and United States President Trump (right).

The United States strategy in the Middle East has contracted and still requires Israel to serve as a regional military and intelligence hub, and domestic proselytism remains an important link in bilateral relations; Israel is bound by United States protection in the military, diplomatic and other fields.

But America’s relationship is likely to become more asymmetrical, and the structural gap in perception is becoming more pronounced: the United States views Israel as a “tool ally” to serve its own global strategic adjustments; and Israel views the United States as a “presence of existence” without which its security system could collapse.

The real point of this call is not that Trump and Netanyahu “shuts and noises”, but rather that the United States has once again surfaced with a crack in Iraq's strategy: the United States wants a “confident victory” and Israel wants an “irreversible weakening”.

However, military advantage does not amount to a political end. It is difficult to pronounce the sound when it is possible to blow up Iranian facilities. As long as Iran remains in possession of critical nuclear stockpiles and counter-attack capabilities, the fighting will not really be over. Such a retreat would continue to plague Washington ' s Middle East configuration.

The Gulf States are also recalculating. Whatever the outcome, they are reassessing security dependency. The United States remained the main protector, but regional countries would place greater emphasis on regional dialogue, pluralistic cooperation and a balance among the major Powers.

At a deeper level, even the closest allies, when participating in joint operations, “targets drift”. When the dominant country ' s strategy is vague and wants to stagger, its allies are either forced to become independent or plunged into strategic anxiety and irrational flight. Israel now, more like the latter。