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Author: Ho Yuxi, Zhejiang Province, Special Research Fellow at the Centre for Research and Research into the Socialist Specialities of China in the New Age of Xi Jinping; Li Boge, Dean and Professor, Maxist Institute, Ningbo University, Postgraduate Director, Maxist Institute, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Division

Source: World Socialist Study, No. 4, 2026

Project: This document is the result of a phase of the major project of the National Fund for Social Science entitled “Initial contribution to the idea of a community of human destiny in the realm of material history and study of world significance” (20&ZD027). The long march is the epic of revolutionary heroes written by the Communist Party of China and the Red Army. Mao's use and interpretation of the concept of the “long march” is based on the different stages of the history of the national renaissance, combining China's specific practical and social development requirements in different revolutionary contexts and making it a dynamic historical process of the Chinese Communist Party ideology. During the land revolution, Mao took the lead in establishing the concept of “long march” in a process of practical reflection, extending it from a mere descriptive verb to an exclusive term for the strategic shift of the Red Army. After the outbreak of the full-scale resistance, Mao combined the concept of a “long march” with the issue of the National Unity Front against Japan, the Party's self-revolution, and gave it a clear sense of practice and thought. Since the establishment of the new China, Mao has further extended the semantic meaning of the “long march” from the political sphere to the economic, intellectual and cultural fields. The resulting “new long march” has not only brought together the common will of the Party and the people to fight for unity, but has become a unique symbol of the spiritual spectrum of the Chinese Communist Party. Keywords: Mao Zedong, Red Army, Long March, Revolution narrative, New Long March.

In view of the historical process of the centennial struggle of the Communist Party of China, as the nucleus of the party ' s first-generation central leadership, Mao has been reflecting on and summing up the history of the strategic shift of the Red Army, which is the main force in the country, and has produced a series of original ideas that are an integral part of Mao ' s thinking. This year marks the ninetieth anniversary of the victory of the Long March, and the in-depth exploration and study of the application and interpretation of the concept of the “long march” in Mao's philosophy is of great relevance to the promotion of the spirit of the Great Long March and to the encouragement of all the nation's entire army to pursue the long march towards the great renaissance of the Chinese nation. In academic history, as a result of the new age's in-depth study of the long march, scholars have published many excellent studies on the Red Army and its contemporary values, starting from classic texts. However, the increase in the number of homogenizing results of traditional text-based research methods has objectively reduced the research space in this area. Since the 18th Congress of the Party, Xi has on several occasions made scientific interpretations of the new era's long march, and how to conduct an in-depth study of the historical retroactivity of the new long march must be traced back to what the Chinese Communist Party, represented by Comrade Mao, meant by the concept of the long march. On this basis, there is an urgent need to go beyond the traditional paradigm of “papers on text” in academic research on the long Red Army and to look at it from a conceptual historical perspective. The conceptual historical perspective considers the expression of a particular concept as an export of ideas in a given historical time and space and in a given historical context, and explores the subject of the intellectual history by using linguistic narrative analysis, focusing both on the historical trajectory of the evolution of the concept itself and on the transformation of political and social structures at a given historical stage. There are a small number of research findings that explore the basics of the Red Army Long War from a conceptual historical perspective, all of which address the significant contribution made by Mao and have the character of academic innovation. However, there is little in the academic world to talk about Mao's use and interpretation of the concept of “long march”, and there are clear limitations in the current study on the concept of “long march”: First, limited to the pictogramal expression of the concept of the “long march”, the academic community often equates the early terminological test with the full content of the concept of the “long march” and lacks abstract thinking about it as a historical domain; second, the weak theoretical construction fails to shed light on the intrinsic logic of this revolutionary discourse as a political symbol from its specific history. The current state of research has led to an understanding of the concept of the long march in the academic community at a descriptive level, failing to grasp the logic of its creation and dissemination as an important political and cultural symbol of modern China. Throughout history, Mao, on the basis of the different historical dimensions of national renewal, has in different revolutionary contexts taken China's specific practical and social development requirements into account by upgrading the purely descriptive verb “long march” to the Chinese Communist Party ideology, representing the Chinese Communist Party's grasp of and position on the future of the Chinese nation at certain historical times. Retroactivity: the concept of “long march” in general

Definitions are a logical way of clarifying the content of the concept. In the Chinese language system, the “long march” has both verbs and the attributes of the term. The term “long march” is used to read, inter alia, “1 long journey” 3 The strategic shift of the Red Army from the north and south of the Yangtze to the district of Zhangansu during the Land Revolution War”. The first is the original and the third is the abstract term of the first, with the Communist Party of China as the subject of the narrative, which is the historic concept of the long march. International understanding of “long march” is based mainly on the definition in the Concise Encyclopedia of Britain: “A long march (between 1934 and 1936), with a major strategic shift in power of the Communist Party of China-led industrial and agricultural Red Army.” Thus, these national and international definitions of the Red Army legion, which define “strategic transfer” as an essential element of the concept of long march, do fit within the meaning of the term “long journey”. The term “long march” has gone through a historic process, from being present within the party to being widely known. In October 1934, the Central Red Army was forced to begin a strategic transfer because of the failure of the fifth anti-circle. As a result of the circumstances of the revolution, the strategic shift did not initially have a fixed name, but rather was called the “spread-out” “westward” etc. In early October 1934, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) issued a circular to the Central Branch, stating that the “Main Red Army Breakout” was an important way of overcoming enemy fortism in order to win the revolution. According to the telegrapher, Huang Liangcheng, the eighth legion of his first army, “Everyone dies with the Soo district, fighting for the Soo district, fighting for the homeland!” `Real readiness to fight back' until “the Deputy Director of the Department of Political Affairs has conveyed orders from the Military Commission to transfer positions, stressing that the transfer to the west was intended to shift the main power to a more hostile aspect, to manoeuvre, and to finally defend the Soo district, to crush the enemy's `fence'”. Thus, the initial objective of the strategic transfer of the Central Red Army was to crush the fifth “crush” of the National Party army, to preserve the existing revolutionary forces, to move west into the enemy and to lead the establishment of the new Sou district. The earlier documents of the Central Red Army led more frequently to the use of “westwards” to point our way forward, as Judd asked on 23 October 1934 that the field forces continue to move west after crossing the Infon River. The term “long march” did not begin to emerge within the party until after the forces broke through the four successive blockade lines and developed a strategic posture at the core of the northern border, the irradiated border. According to the available revolutionary literature, the official text of the term “long march” is the first to be recorded in revolutionary practice in the spring of 1935. In February 1935, the General Department of the Red Army published a "Way to the Workers and Farmers " book in the village of Yoo-baum in Liang Village, Xii Shui County, which began with a reference to "We Industrial and Agricultural Red Army transferred from Jiangxi to combat areas and long marched to Hong Kong Guibang territory". In May of the same year, the Central Red Army successfully crossed the Jinsha River and entered the northern Sichuan Sunshan Autonomous Region. In order to spread the message of the Red Army's national policy and revolution to its compatriots, the Chinese Industrial and Agricultural Red Army Proclamation, published in the name of the Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army, once again refers to the term “long march”, which reads “a long march of the Red Army, which has been broken”. The announcement did not attract much attention within the party when the troops were busy turning to the war, in addition to the urgency of the revolution. Nor can the “long march” at this time be understood as a historical concept: It refers only to the long-distance expedition of the Central Red Army, and does not include the subsequent military transfer of the Red Two and Red Four; it remains a descriptive verb and is no different from what was previously referred to as the “spread-out” “westward” of the military operation within the CPC and the Red Army. Even after the Red One and Red Four division, Red Star, published by the General Political Department of the Chinese Industrial and Rural Red Army, continued to call the long-distance march and combat of the Red One Army “Western Migration”. As a key element of the historical narrative of the Chinese revolution, the “long march” is a historical concept that took shape after several waves. This concept is, in fact, the first generation of the central leadership of the party, with Comrade Mao at its core, based on the re-thinking and distilling of the historical significance of this great military operation, the strategic shift of the national Red Army, which is gradually abstracted. The concept of the “long march” was not gradually established until the end of the long march, from the point of view to the abstract improvement. In his forward report on the north-west of Kawakawa and the Red Four Army, Xu made a preliminary reference to the basic content of the concept of the “long march”, which read: “The long march of the Western Army, the Blue City and the destruction of the enemy”. Since then, the term “long march” has gradually appeared in the central document. Although at that time the three main forces had not yet succeeded, the capital camp of the Revolution was essentially north-west. This means that the military pressure of the primary Red Army ' s strategic shift has been phased out, that it has been possible to trace and analyse the historical processes that have come to an end, and that the individual ' s perception of past historical activities has improved into a sense of reason; and that it is only on this occasion that the term "long march" can be expanded from a mere descriptive verb to an exclusive term for the national main Red Army ' s strategic shift. By words: the concept of Mao Zedong and the concept of the “long march” during the long march

Mao first used the term “long march” at the Haddashon conference. In September 1935, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC), which led the Red Zone army, entered the Khada site in the south of Gansu. During the rest of the week, meetings of the Central Political Bureau and of the above-ranking cadres were held. The Redsolder Xiaobing recalled that Mao had called for the “over 20,000 miles march” of troops to overcome all the difficulties that followed and to move north towards the anti-Japanese position at the Hada conference. On 19 October 1935, Mao Zedong presented the basics of the Long March in a conversation with Xiaobing, “We marched 12 months and 5 days”, pointing to the map to explain “the largest distance of more than 25,000 miles”, and concluded by affirming the strategic significance of the Long March in the history of China's revolution, namely, that “The Long March is bitter and can do a great job, that the Red Army is known to the world as a hero and that Chiang Kai-shek's reaction is useless”. This interpretation by Mao is important in the construction of the concept of “long march”. Not only did he link the “long march” to the “twenty-five thousand miles” specific time and distance units of “two months and five days”, but he also used the term “long march” as a conceptual term, using the Chinese Communist Party as the subject of the narrative, giving the initial political meaning to the “long march”. Mao Zedong was mainly given poetry for the long march, and its representatives were the 7th Long March, the 1st Quincho Quinlan, the 6th Mount, and the 6th Mount, the Pendway. These poems are not only an important part of the linguist system of long-serving narratives, but also promote the semantic content of the concept of “long march” from military operations to cultural symbols by displaying the revolutionary optimism of Red Army fighters on their way. On 5 November 1935, Mao Zedong led the Central Red Army ' s guana unit to the Bay of Elephant, where it addressed the accompanying forces, noting that “it is a true march never before seen”. He encouraged the gays who remained after a long march to unite with the local people in order to fulfil the great mission of the Chinese Revolution and to create a new situation for the Chinese Revolution. It should be noted, however, that while the concept of “long march” is in its early form in Mao's manuscripts and internal speeches, at this time the use of the expression remains limited to internal communication between a very small number of people and high-level leaders and has not yet produced a broad social communication effect. The scope of dissemination of this expression is limited to specific historical conditions: on the one hand, the statements are contained in undisclosed party secrets or in the minutes of senior management meetings; on the other hand, more popular expressions such as “strategic transfer” and “graft” are still used at the level of the Red Army forces and the local population. As a vehicle of the Chinese Communist Party's ideological discourse, the “long march” extends from the sphere of perception within the party to the extra-party social sphere, essentially rooted in the profound changes in China's revolutionary strategic landscape. As Japan's imperialist powers intensified their aggression against China, the Communist Party of China (CPC) took advantage of the situation in the country's path of salvation, taking advantage of the main internal contradictions and reorienting its political course and revolutionary strategy, thereby giving meaning to new revolutionary practices. In December 1935, Mao Zedong gave a report on his strategy against Japanese imperialism at a meeting of activists of the Wajiroburg Party, which provided a comprehensive reflection and summary of the history of the strategic shift of the Red Army. First, in the presence of all the comrades present, he described the long march as “a major transfer of positions between the three main Chinese Red Army forces” since the first half of the year, noting that the transfer had transformed the old area into a guerrilla zone and expanded the influence of Soviet Bolsheviism throughout China. Second, he correctly assessed the long march from the point of view of Marxist materialism, arguing that “the Red Army has failed on one side (in terms of maintaining its original positions) and won on the other (in terms of completing the Long March plan)” and rejecting the erroneous view of the internal and external misinterpretation of this strategic action. Thirdly, he confirmed the significance of the long march by using the three images of the “promulgation” “screeching machine”, namely, “the long march is the first time in history, the long march is the manifesto, the long march is the propaganda team, and the long march is the seeding machine”, stressing that the long march not only declared to the world the failure of imperialism and the reactionary opposition of the National Party, but also informed the public about the Chinese Communist Party's revolutionary path towards national independence and the liberation of the people, but also spreads the revolutionary fire along the way against foreign oppression. Fourth, he argued for the important role of the long march in the exercise and preservation of a committed cadre of revolutionary cadres, summing up that the root cause of the victory was the leadership of the Communist Party of China, and that the end of the long march was seen as the beginning of a united national front against Japan. In June 1936, the United States journalist Edgar Snowe came to the border area of Zhuganing and opened the process of international dissemination of long-form narratives. In a four-month interview, Mao explained to Snow not only the political claims of the Chinese Soviet regime, but also the reasons for the strategic transfer of the Red Army, which was recast as a revolutionary military operation on the front line in the fight against Japan. In August of the same year, Mao Zedong and Yang Sangkun sent a telegram to the forces for the publication of the Long Book, calling on the heads to mobilize and organize the cadres of the division, to make several pieces of what they had experienced during the long march, folk folk and stories of wonder, and to submit them to the General Political Department by 5 September. This military practice is consistent with the dialectics of theory, so that the concept of the long march carries both the historical core of strategic transfer and the symbolism of the “revolutionary epics”. In February 1937, under the editor of Tinling et al., the writing was completed, and Juddi wrote the book " The Chief of the Red Army " (also known as " 25,000 miles " ). As the first collective oral history of the Red Army soldiers, the Red Chiefs of the Army has broken the gap of previous grand narratives, with plain language and the most real and direct feelings of individuals in the word, which greatly enriched the writing of the Long March as a spiritual symbol. As the story of the Long March spreads, it is becoming more and more known to ordinary people. When Mao's strategy was interpreted as a cross-border dissemination of the Western Lodge by American journalist Edgar Snow, the Long March finally completed the transformation of the symbol from Chinese Labour and Rural Red Army strategic terminology to the Chinese Revolution Spiritual Tatten, which became the world's hallmark of the Chinese revolution. The “long march” is thus written in an annals of history and is now the expression of well-known words. III. PURPOSE: Preliminary application of the concept of the “long march” by Mao after the long march

In the practical process of leading the party and the people to a neo-democratic revolution, Mao combines the “long march” with the issue of the national unity front against Japan, the party's self-revolution, and develops important political ideas to guide the Chinese revolution. Especially during the period of full-scale resistance, Mao's dynamic background, based on the evolution of the situation of resistance and the alignment of relations with the State, has not only continued to deepen the theoretical interpretation of the concept of the “long march”, but also by linking the spirit of the long march to the goal of building a new China, thereby making it an important concept “new long march” that expresses the vision of a new China. Shortly after the end of the long march, the Communist Party of China developed a revolution on the basis of which to consolidate and expand the national unity front against Japan by leading the anti-Japanese guerrilla war against the enemy and seeking the revival of the Chinese nation. After the comprehensive anti-Japanese war had moved from the defence phase to the one-on-one phase, and in the face of anti-communist friction created by the National Party and Japan ' s policy of seduction, Mao Zedong, in May 1939, delivered a speech entitled " The Enduring Struggle " , which translated the hard work of the long march into political rhetoric encouraging youth to work together. During this period, the Communist Party of China (CPC) has swarmed with ethnic crises and class conflicts, while the spirit of the Red Army, which has broken through the siege and crossed the snowhills on its long march, has provided a spiritual prototype for the mobilization words “must bring the revolution to a successful end”. In this speech, Mao stressed the need for youth to develop a spirit of permanent struggle, a spirit that goes hand in hand with the struggle of the Communist Party of China during the long march, “when the Red Army fought in the grassland for 50 days without food or bark, which only the Communist Party could do and no one else could do”. By reshaping the long narrative system, Mao links not only the concept of the “long march” with the “renewal of the Chinese nation”, but also with its particular historical context, transforming the long march from the historical events of the revolution into a specific expectation for young people, who should continue to fight hard and hard for the Red Army and fight permanently against the anti-communists, such as tyrannical and corrupt officials. On 9 December 1939, at a conference in Yanan to commemorate the fourth anniversary of the one-hundred-Nin Movement, Mao Zedong placed the Long March and the Youth Rescue Movement as the historical anchor of the party's leadership in the promotion of a phased victory in the war against Japan, stating: “The Red Army comrades have completed such a great march and the student comrades have launched such a great rescue campaign in North Ping, both of which are fighting for the liberation of the people from national reconciliation, the immediate significance of which is to advance the war against Japan.” In other words, Mao believes that the long-duration march achieved a strategic shift from a military victory by the Red Army to a “Northerer Anti-Japanese” and that the First and Second Nine Movement completed a political breakthrough in “Stop the Civil War” with a wave of awakening among students, which together together constitute the anti-Japanese national unity front under the Communist Party. It is thus clear that after almost six months of observation and practice, Mao has gone beyond the earlier stage of “probation” to the expression and concept of “long march”. In the light of the changes in the situation, he has expanded the concept of “long march” in his narratives and, in the context of youth, has shaped the term “long march” into a new era of “action” calling for youth to fight for a permanent struggle, in which both the Red Army and the student movement have advanced the overall interests of the Chinese nation, thus moving to the “advocacy” stage in the expression of the long march. This rhetoric is intrinsically linked to the strategic shift of the land revolution and the nation-wide struggle, and it marks the evolution of the Chinese Communist Party's ideological discourse, which is carried by the concept of “long march”. In the 1940s, in order to properly address the problem of combining the universal truth of Marx Leninism with the concrete practices of the Chinese revolution, the first generation of central leaders of the party, with Comrade Mao at its core, focused on the construction of the Yyanan and launched a winding education campaign within the party. The campaign, which is centred on the opposition to subjectivity, sectarianism and the eight branches of the party, has been in progress from October 1943 to a period of historical experience of the party. In the course of a systematic review of the history of the Communist Party of China, Mao's understanding of the Long March is also deepening. On the one hand, he called on the troops to implement policies related to good military discipline, in the light of the significant losses caused by the swollen structure and rigid command during the long march. In August 1942, Mao Zedong, in a telegram to Chen Yi on the idea of a short-duration policy for the Chinese-Chinese region, stated: “There can still be long marches in times of civil war, and there must be no long march now.” The “long march” here has a clear political message: during the strategic phase, China's resistance, despite the frequent “sweeping” of the Japanese and pseudo-national forces, does not have the conditions for a large-scale strategic shift, as it did during the long march, and only a political strategy of a lean and simple government can ensure the stability of China's resistance. In this telegram, Mao drew on the historical lessons of the long march, clearly linking the long march to the policy of a lean army, and, by contrasting history with reality, emphasizing that only a practical approach can ensure a stable development based on the sun, indicating the direction towards a simplified military regime and the transformation of its institutions. On the other hand, Mao has repeatedly affirmed the positive significance of the long march in the training of the army and the building of its cadres. For example, on 14 October 1943, at a meeting of senior cadres of the Central North-West Bureau of the Communist Party of China (CPC), Mao Zedong stressed the key role played by the long march in refining the strong will of the People's Army, noting that the army and its cadres “had undergone a long march of 25,000 miles and were well known and experienced”, and called on the army to continue to implement the ten main policies, including the best of the army. At the dawn of the victory in 1944, Mao once again referred to the forces left behind by the long march as “a great future for development”. In addition, he built on the historical context of the Chinese revolution and stressed the important role of the long march, namely, the Ganning Boundary, in promoting the development of the Chinese revolution. On 15 February 1945, Mao Zedong stated in Time Issues and Others: “The march has been painful, and has come to this place for a rest, called the landing point. We are not going to live here forever. This place is a place of rest and a point of departure.” This means that the Chinese Communist Party, represented by Mao Zedong, has established the concept of the Long March as a turning point in the Chinese revolution: In the history of the Chinese revolution, the long march ended the passivity of the “left” wrong course, while at the same time creating a new situation in which the Chinese revolution was resolved independently and independently. At this time, the semantic meaning of the “long march” has been extended to the field of style-building and has become a unique concept in the Chinese Communist Party ideological discourse. After the victory in 1945, in the face of the serious situation in which the National Party unilaterally tore down the “Ten Accords” and unleashed a full-scale civil war, Mao further expanded the semantics of the concept of the “long march”, translating the lessons of the long march into a reference source for strategic decision-making, proposing that all reactionary forces be eliminated by revolutionary war, that the leadership and people take over the victory of the neo-democratic revolution and that obstacles to modernization be removed. On 12 August 1947, as Liu Deng's army jumped thousands of miles into the mountains, Mao stressed, in the light of lessons learned during the 25,000-mile long march, that “many of that rush was unnecessary” and demanded that the army avoid unnecessary losses due to impatience. This flexibility of continuity between the experience of the long march and the struggle of reality was reflected in Mao's release in December of the same year in “The current situation and our mission” as “the primary objective of the destruction of the living strength of the enemy and not of the preservation or seizure of cities and places”, and as a key force in the subsequent strategic offensive. On the eve of the establishment of the People's Republic of China, Mao Zedong stated at the seventh second plenary session of the Party that “it is only the first step towards a national victory,” stressing that, while the party-led Chinese revolution has been great for more than 20 years, the longer and more difficult journeys after the revolution will not relax vigilance, as the pride of victory, the feeling of self-fulfilment, the mood of stagnation, the false feeling of greed and pleasure to live a difficult life may grow. The new circumstances facing the Associated Party at that time, Mao Zedong knew that the future of China was a long and twilight march, each of which was fraught with hardships and challenges. Here, Mao has given a new political connotation to the “long march”: on the one hand, it is clear that the “first step” will be taken, that is, the swift national victory of the Chinese revolution, and, on the other hand, it cautions the whole party that the national victory is by no means the end of the revolution, but merely the beginning of the “long march” – the socialist revolution and construction – and leads the whole party to realize that the victory of this revolution is only a small step. After the national victory, the parties and the people will continue to face the Miles march to build a new China, and how will they continue to follow the new long journey? These will be major issues to be addressed by the first generation of central leaders of the party, centred on Comrade Mao. The entire party should therefore continue to maintain its modest, unsatisfied and hard-working working style. With the establishment of a new China, the expression “new long march” has evolved into a “new long march” in the modernization of socialism, symbolizing the hard struggle to achieve new goals in the new era of history. IV. CONCLUSION: The In-depth interpretation of the concept of the “long march” by Mao after the establishment of the new China Fire!

With the establishment of the new China, how to consolidate the nascent democratic regime and restore the national economy became a major issue that the ruling Communist Party of China must resolve. With a view to placing the Chinese nation in the forest of the nations of the world, Mao, on the basis of an analysis of the main contradictions of society, has incorporated the concepts of hard-won intellectual education, real-life research and so forth into the concept of “long march”, and has extended the term of the concept of “long march” further into the economic, intellectual and cultural sphere, with the aim of creating a socialist revolution and building words “to keep the cadres and the masses constantly full of revolutionary enthusiasm”. After three years of recovery and adjustment, the task of national economic recovery was successfully completed by the end of 1952. At the same time, Mao realized that the main contradictions in our society had turned into a conflict between the working class and the national bourgeois, and hoped to promote rapid productivity development by transforming productive relations. In order to maintain the enthusiasm and dynamism of the entire nation during the revolution, Mao once again calls on all revolutionary workers throughout the country to continue the hard work they have forged on the long march, “remaining the hard work that they have had in the Yyan and Xingnin areas for more than a decade”. This call not only enriches the concept of the Long March, but also inspires the staff at large to remember the undaunted and tenacious historical memory of the long march, which in turn inspires all the nation's people to continue to be so in the new march of socialism. After the fundamental completion of the three major transformations of socialism, and with the introduction of the “super-engineer-to-American” strategic vision, the country began to experience a sharp and quick-forward trend in exploring the path of socialist modernization and a radical “left” blunder. After the “left” tipper error, Mao combined the “long march” with Marxist practice, underscoring the importance of a hard-working, practical and ideological path that had developed during the long march. On 23 March 1961, Mao stressed the importance of practical experience at a central working session in Guangzhou, stating that “it would not have been possible to write my booklet “Strategic issues of China's Revolutionary War” without the failure of the fifth anti-war, and without a long march”. The application of the concept of “long march” in the area of economic construction has opened a whole new page of the conceptual shift of “long march”. In summary, since the establishment of the new China, the first-generation central leadership of the party, with comrade Mao Zedong at its core, has always aimed at national renewal, using the concept of the “long march” as a guide to economic construction and an important vehicle for the education of young people in ideological politics, and promoting its integration into the Chinese Communist Spiritual System, thus becoming the hallmark of today's understanding of Mao Zedong's mentality. Concluding remarks

Mau's interpretation and application of the concept of “long march” at different times, with its semantic references to the trajectories of the theory, is a profound demonstration of the Chinese Communist Party's practical wisdom to combine the principles of Marx Leninism with China's actual reality. The first-generation central leadership of the party, with Comrade Mao at its core, has always been based on the real needs of the Chinese revolution and construction, and has made the realization of the great renaissance of the Chinese nation a fundamental theme of theoretical innovation, based on adherence to the principles of Marxism, with a continuing and deepening reading of the event of the Great Revolution. It was Mao’s creative interpretation that made the story of the Long March truly “lives” – from a simple description of military operations during the land revolution to a symbol of political mobilization during the war, to a composite theoretical symbol covering the economic, intellectual and cultural fields after the establishment of the new China, and that the “long march” became the symbol of China’s revolution and a widely celebrated revolutionary epic that became a vivid example of the era of Marxism. The regularity of approaches and experience inherent in the historical evolution of this concept provides a profound inspiration for the adherence to and development of Marxism in the new era. The first is the extension of the semantics, which is rooted in revolutionary practice. Practice-based is fundamental to Marxist theoretical innovation. In the historical practice of leading the strategic transition of the Red Army, Mao recast the words “long march” in the Gudhan language as a political term for military revolutionary action; promoted the leap of the long march from the military to the political dimension by integrating the doctrine of the united front and the construction of the ethos following the outbreak of the general resistance; and, after the establishment of the new China, injected the dictum of the socialist revolution and construction into it, which went beyond the political sphere to form a composite theoretical symbol covering the economic, cultural and other spheres. From the objectives of the “four modernizations” struggle to the grand blueprint of the “socialist modern and powerful country”, the “new long march” rhetoric has brought on the spirit of the revolution and the struggle in the traditional long-caste, and has led to a new era of theoretical innovation by the Chinese Communist Party. Second, practical exploration of the main axis of national renewal. Marxist theory has always resonated with national destiny. At the Waquon Fort, Mao positioned the Long March as a “promulgation” “broadcasting machine” with national salvation at its core, as a spiritual bond between the resistance and the resistance; at the party's seventh session, at the 2nd plenary session, it was proposed that “the victory over the country is only the first step in the long march” and that the triumph of the Revolution should be linked to the goal of building a new China, with a view to furthering the anchor of national development; and during the period of socialism, it was called upon to carry on the long march to fight hard and hard to bring people together in order to revive the economy and advance industrialization. From national independence to the strength of the State, the concept of the “long march” has always been linked to the interests of the people, as well as to the spiritual genes of the Chinese nation's self-empowerment, and to the ideological banner of the unity of the party that led the people to recovery. Thirdly, theoretical innovation with the modernity. The eternal charm of Marxism lies in its theoretical character of openness and inclusion. During the land revolution, the concept of “long march” focused on the needs of the military struggle, defining the term for the strategic transfer of the main forces of the Red Army; the requirements for integration and the building of the culture of the resistance during the period of the war, rising to the words of political mobilization; and the introduction of the socialist revolution and the construction theme into the new China after its establishment, overcoming the political context and creating a composite theoretical symbol. From the “long march” to the “new long march” to the “new long march”, the elements of which adhere to the fundamental position of Marxism and give new direction to practice in the light of the changing times. This process is a profound confirmation of the essence of Marxism’s development in practice, guiding practice in development, and provides an important follow-up to current theoretical innovation: while upholding fundamental positions and fundamental principles, and responding with openness to the issues of the times, opening up a new era of Marxism’s Chineseization in a virtuous interaction between practice and theory. “Each generation has a long journey for each generation, and each generation must take its own journey.” In the 18 years since the Party's 18th anniversary, the victory of the fight against poverty, the breakthroughs in science, technology and innovation, and the systemic achievements of ecological civilization-building have collectively given the concept of the Long March a new era. It's a hell of a long way to go, and it's starting to get worse. The spirit of the Great Long March is a reflection of the revolutionary character of the Communist Party of China and the People ' s Army, of the self-empowerment of the Chinese nation and of the patriotism of revolutionary practice. In the new context of the new journey of the new era, efforts should be made to renew the spirit of the great long march and to write a new chapter and create a new miracle along the great cause of the first generation of the revolution, on the path to the complete construction of a modern socialist State and the great renaissance of the Chinese nation. The Chinese Communist Party continues its long march, which belongs to our generation, in the wake of the ongoing struggle to reform and open up the ice, from the life and death of the Conference to the battle of the new era. In conclusion, during the historical period of revolution, construction and reform, the Communist Party of China has constantly enriched the narratives of this revolutionary hero's epics and continued to advance the theoretical innovations of the Marxist Chinese era, using the story of the Red Army for its spiritual basis.