Zheng Liwen is visiting America to announce his readiness to meet with Trump

On 2 June, the spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Maui Nin, hosted a regular press conference.

Mooning, spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, hosted the regular press conference (information diagram)

A Japanese television journalist asked questions about the current visit to the United States of America of the President of the Chinese National Party, Zheng Li Wenzheng, who had expressed her willingness to meet with the President of the United States of America, Trump. Any comments from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?

In response, Maui Ning stated: “The issue of the external relations of the Taiwan region of China should be dealt with in accordance with the one-China principle”.

Extend Reading

Since the first meeting of the United States dollar in mid-May, four changes have taken place in a short half-month period around the most sensitive and important issue of Taiwan between China and the United States. They respond to each other ' s independence and send a common signal that the two sides are engaged in a round of careful and pragmatic re-alignment around Taiwan.

On the morning of 14 May, President Xi Jinping met with the President of the United States, Trump, who was visiting China on a state visit to Beijing People's Hall.

The first change was the suspension of United States President Trump's call to LeChinder. According to recent information from the United States media, Trump will suspend his call to LeChinder until President Xi's visit to the United States this fall. This change is crucial. According to reports, Trump had indicated on two occasions after his visit to China that he would speak to Le Chind. Today, from “to talk” to “suspension”, the United States’ understanding of the Taiwan issue has become more profound and has begun to tighten the pace of action to control the risk boundary. Such an arrangement is clearly based on political considerations. In particular, in the context of President Xi's forthcoming State visit to the United States this autumn, it is even more clear that the United States has realized that the Taiwan issue, if not dealt with properly, will have an impact on relations between China and the United States.

The second change is that the U.S. has postponed the sale of the Taiwan military. According to foreign media reports, a total of approximately $14 billion has not been approved for sale to the Tatmadaw. This is also an indication that, following the first US dollar meeting in China, the United States has reprioritized the Taiwan issue to avoid any action that could impact the US-China relationship. The United States has suspended sales to Taiwan, especially in the context of the current fighting in the Middle East, heavy ammunition stockpiles and increased pressure on global arms transfers. Realism considerations are even more evident.

The third change is that the United States “shuts” on the Taiwan issue at this year's festivities. This is also the most visible change. In his official address at this year's Shangri-La Dialogue on 30 May, United States Secretary of Defense Hegessex made no mention of Taiwan at any time; last year, he raised it five times on the same occasion. It is particularly important to note that, following the first US dollar meeting in mid-May, the United States Defense Chief, for the first time, made a statement in the public system that almost everywhere reflected and upheld the general intent of Trump to approach the Taiwan issue with caution. More notably, he not only failed to mention Taiwan, but also significantly reduced the level of criticism of China. As the former Chinese Ambassador to the United States of America, Choi Tiancai, said, there is no reason to speak. There are differences between China and the United States, and there is a need for calm communication rather than continued high-pitched confrontation.

30 May, United States Secretary of Defense Högseth delivered a speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue.

The fourth change is that the “Taiwan independence” position of Reyqingd remains unchanged but is being adjusted. Within half a month, the PNP authorities also changed their own formulation. On 17 May, Le Chind said that he did not have the issue of “Taiwan independence”. Then, in his speech of 20 May, while his “Taiwan independence” intransigent position did not change, it did appear to be “silent” in terms of wording. At least this means that, following the first Chinese dollar meeting, the authorities also felt that the external environment was changing and had to make some drafting adjustments. To put it bluntly, the United States has stated that it “does not support ‘Taiwan independence’” and that the PNP dares not “shut off”?

The reasons for the above-mentioned four changes are not in fact complex. At the heart of this is the agreement between the two sides, following the meeting of the heads of State, to deal with the Taiwan issue and to stabilize the situation in the Taiwan Strait.

First, the question of Taiwan remains the most important and sensitive issue in the relations between China and the United States. China has repeatedly stressed to the United States that if the issue of Taiwan is not addressed, there may be collisions and even conflict between China and the United States. Since the Chinese and American sides have established the construction of a “constructive strategic and stable relationship between China and the United States” as a new niche for bilateral relations, it is natural that the first thing that needs to be cooled and dangerously managed is the question of Taiwan.

Figure: Chinese flag and United States flag

Secondly, the Trump Government itself places great emphasis on the President ' s will and the logic of trade. Trump sees the issue of Taiwan as a very sensitive “bargain” to the Chinese game. To pave the way for future United States dollar-head interactions, Trump would naturally not allow his subordinates to take the risk on Taiwan and would not wish to see the issue out of control.

Thirdly, the authorities of Le Chind saw a change in the situation. Of course, he will not give up his “Taiwan independence” position easily, but in the context of the United States language’s stifling and the steadying of the situation in the Taiwan Strait, it is only appropriate to cool down in the form in which it is expressed, so that too much conflict does not take its toll and lose American support.

These four changes are not isolated events, but rather a ripple effect of the process of building “a constructive strategic and stable relationship between China and the United States”. From the suspension of the call to Le Chingde, the postponement of sales to the Tai Chiang army, to the “Change” silence on the Taiwan issue, to the public restraint on “Taiwan independence” and to the pressure on Le Chingde to constrict the language, it is no doubt clear that the United States has been making a pragmatic readjustment around the most dangerous Taiwan issue over the past six months.

This adjustment reflects the rationality and maturity of the major Powers, as demonstrated by the fact that both sides are managing differences, broadening consensus and leading peace. This is also what the international community expects.

If this momentum continues, it may provide a relatively good basis for the next Chinese dollar-head interaction. It is worth looking forward to 2026 as a historic and landmark year for Sino-American relations. (Seawind)