Zhou Eun came to think and practice about China's relationship with the world anti-fascist united front

Executive summary: Since the beginning of the national resistance, Zhou En has come to work to “expand international propaganda” and to actively project an international image of the Communist Party of China as an important anti-fascist force, advocating for the establishment and maintenance of an international anti-fascist front in the East through “capturing the commonality between the two sides against fascism”. He explored in theory the interrelationship between China's anti-Japanese war and the world war against fascism, raising earlier the idea of placing the war against Japan in the ranks of the world's anti-fascist war, arguing that it was impossible for China to “leave the world in isolation and do it alone”; at the same time, China “has always been at the forefront of the war against east-style fascism” and “had been at the forefront of the East-East anti-fascist war”, one of the principals of the international anti-fascist aggression front, and that the world anti-fascist war “depended on China's resistance”. After the outbreak of the Pacific War, Zhou En advanced the idea of an “anti-fascist front in the Pacific”. On the issue of seeking assistance, Zhou En has expanded the one-way perception of national governments seeking international assistance to the two-way perception of international cooperation. With regard to the successful outcome of the world war against fascism, Zhou En has proposed that this would be the “key of victory and failure” for China, “the moment of change in China's destiny” and that China should “strength in the world” and “responsible to the civilized world”. Zhou En ' s awareness of and approach to China ' s relations with the world anti-fascist united front has greatly enriched the international dissemination of the Chinese Communist Party ' s doctrine and practice, reflecting the Chinese Communist Party ' s position in the world; it has also greatly enriched the theoretical understanding of the world ' s anti-fascist united front, showing vividly its great contribution to advocating the establishment of a world anti-fascist united front and advancing the world ' s anti-fascist war victory. Keywords: Zhou Eunyi/ Anti-Japanese War/ United Front against fascism/

The author's introduction: Pan Zheng Guo, Research Fellow, Institute of History and Documentation of the Communist Party of China (Beijing 100080). Source: Party Documentation (Kyoto) 2025, No. 5, pp. 93-100

Since the beginning of the national struggle, Zhou Eun has actively promoted the international image of the Communist Party of China as an important anti-fascist force, promoting the formation of a broad world anti-fascist united front for all peoples and seeking international cooperation against fascism. His reflection on China ' s relationship with the world anti-fascist united front reflects the Chinese Communist Party ' s understanding of the relationship between the Japanese war and the world anti-fascist war, and vividly demonstrates the great contribution of the Communist Party of China in advocating the establishment of the world anti-fascist united front and the promotion of the world ' s anti-fascist war victory. Efforts to “expand international advocacy” to project an international image of the Communist Party of China as an important anti-Fascist force

In the wake of the 9-8 events, the Chinese-Japanese ethnic tension has gradually risen beyond the internal class conflict to be the main one. In 1935, the Seventh International Congress of Communists convened and proposed that fascism be a war and called for the broadest anti-fascist united front. The CCP Central Centre established a new strategy for the establishment of a unified national front against Japan following the Waqf Fort conference. The international community must be made aware of the Communist Party of China in order to build the broadest national unity front against Japan. But at this time, the Western countries have little knowledge of the Communist Party of China and its policy claims. In particular, the Communist Party has been “shaping” internationally “demonized” images such as “kill-and-fire” by “communists”, especially under the false and discredited influence of the National Party. In this regard, Snow said: “There is no greater mystery and confusion in the world than in the case of Red China.” In July 1936, when Zhou En came to see Snow, he welcomed Western journalists to the region, allowed him to interview “whatever he saw” and gave him “all help to visit the region”. It was with the active impetus of Zhou Enlai that, for the first time, the Communist Party of China, thanks to the publication of the Western Mandarin, presented to the international community its image and its firm opposition to the fascist attitude of Japan. Following the outbreak of national resistance, Zhou Enlai, during his leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) Central Changjiang Bureau, raised the need to expand the international campaign of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and increase international awareness of the Communist Party of China (CPC). To this end, the Yangtze Bureau has established an International Advocacy Group, which Zhou Eun has asked for more contacts with journalists, writers, eminent persons and diplomats from around the world, offering them the daily newspaper Xinhua, articles from Mao Zedong and the 8th Roads War newspaper, and contributing to the Communist International magazine. He also assisted world-renowned director Evans in the production of a documentary reflecting the activities of the Chinese Communist Party delegation in Wuhan, which had some international impact. Evans later recalled: “This visit met Zhou Eun and received many of his attention and knowledge of China.”

In January 1939, the Central South Bureau of the CCP was established in Chongqing as the main working body of the Party's governing district, with Zhou Enlai as Secretary. Zhou En has come to ask the South Bureau to “expand international publicity” and, in particular, “the impact of overseas newspapers is particularly great and there is a special need to approach”.7 He suggested at the meeting of the Central Political Bureau that the Party's unified front strategy and approach should include “extension of international influence”8 and noted that “international attention is also high on China's issues”9 and called for external advocacy to “advocacy” to “get over”. To that end, he worked hard to build friendships with the American writer Hemingway and others, to maintain contacts with the Vietnamese Revolutionary Leader Ho Chi Minh, the leader of the Great Indian Congress, Nehru, and the leader of the patriotic Chinese diaspora Hu Wenhu, to engage closely with Dr. Hanhua, foreign journalists, missionaries and others, to participate in the creation of the Chinese-Soviet Association and other cultural organizations, to support Song Qinggi's creation of the “Defence for China Alliance”, to enlist the support of the diaspora, and to support Japanese anti-war activists in the deer field. In Chongqing, the Chinese Japan Coalition Against War was established, and Hu was the editor-in-chief of Singapore's South China Journal of Commerce. He actively promoted various channels of voice and propaganda against fascism by the Chinese Communist Party abroad. In the winter of 1939 to the spring of 1940, after the first anti-colossal climax of the Nationalist Party's intransigent wing, Zhou Enlai pointed out from the perspective of the world anti-fascist united front that “this situation is only in the interest of the Japanese, German and other fascist countries, to the detriment of the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada” (11). He instructed the South Office's Foreign Office “to work free from ideological differences with foreign Chinese and to capture the commonality between the two parties against fascism” (12). At the direction of Zhou Enlai, the South Bureau has been active in propagating the Party's ideas to foreign journalists, giving books to the 8th Road Army and the New Four, “No less than 20 or 30, affecting the credibility of our party and some diplomatic influence” (13). After a period of effort, in particular frequent contacts with the British-American Ambassador and others, the South Bureau has made great progress in its struggle against friction. On 24 December 1940, Zhou Eun-Chou reported to the Maoists and the Central Communist Party (CPM) that the recent general battle had been the most effective at the diplomatic level. (14) CCP has acknowledged the work of the South Bureau and has called for increased outreach from all sources. At the beginning of 1941, the National Party launched a coup d ' état, with its second anti-coopération. Following the events, and in response to the National Party plot, Zhou En came to arrange extensive contacts between Southern Bureau staff and officials and journalists, so that they would “be fully informed of the facts” (15). He took the initiative to meet with the Personal Representative of the President of the United States, Curi, the Soviet Ambassador to China, Pan Myung-sung, the military attaché, Choi Koff, and the British Ambassador to China, Carl, among others, to press the international community to put pressure on the anti-communist activities of the National Party. In the midst of political public opinion, the British Government warned the National Party that the civil war would only intensify the Japanese army's attacks. (16) Curie officially stated to Chiang Kai-shek that the United States was unable to provide substantial assistance to China until the dispute had been resolved. (17) Through its successful diplomatic work, Zhou En has, on the one hand, responded strongly to the anti-Communist conspiracy of the Nationalist Party (PNP), which has led to its isolation and passivity, and, on the other hand, has strongly shaped the international image of the Communist Party of China as an important anti-fascist force, helping the international community to better understand and support the Chinese Communist Party in its anti-Japanese struggle. Following the outbreak of the Pacific War, on 13 December 1941, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued a directive on the Pacific Anti-Japanese Unified Front, stating that the Chinese people and the Communist Party of China were of particular importance to the British-United States unified front. (18) Zhou Enlai also published the following day a long article on the Pacific War and World War Bureau, which set out the attitude of the Chinese Communist Party and accurately predicted the dynamics of the Pacific War. (19)

In 1943, the obstinate National Party tried to launch its third anti-communist orgasm on the occasion of the international dissolution of the Communist Party. At the same time, the Soviet Red Army ended the battle of Stalingrad and the allied forces launched a counter-attack against the Japanese army on the Pacific battlefield. In response to the complex situation at home and abroad, CCP has used the international unity front as an important measure to stop the National Party from launching an anti-communist orgasm. In directing the work of the South Bureau, Zhou Enlai analysed that “it is estimated that domestic public opinion and British and American attitudes may influence Chiang”. He asked the South Bureau to “continue its efforts in the coming months to explain our position to the people at home and abroad, and to provide information about our political, military and economic achievements, which the Nationalist Inspectorate has refused to publish”. (20) To this end, the Bureau of the South used various opportunities to publish to the United Kingdom and the United States, among others, the “Summary of the Communist Party of China against All Hypothetical Army” and the “Comparison of the achievements of the two parties in the fight against war”. Under the facilitation of the South Bureau, Ambassadors United States, British and Soviets met urgently to warn the National Party against a civil war or to stop aid. With the combined efforts of national and international forces, the anti-communist climax that the National Party was trying to launch ended in failure, and the UCPS and the national anti-war effort were upheld. In 1944, thanks to the efforts of Zhou Enlai and the South Bureau, the United States Military Observer Group visited Yanan, the first official exchange between the United States and the Communist Party of China, known by Mao as “the most exciting event since China's resistance” (21). In the same year, a North-West interview mission of Chinese and foreign journalists visited Yanan, “the largest story of Red China” (22). U.S. journalist Wudo of the Balmo Sun, who served as a Minister of State in the National Party and had a one-sided knowledge of the Communist Party of China, wrote in the newspaper Xinhua Daily after a field visit that said that the Communist Party was “political democracy, strong resistance” (23). In response to these two successful foreign affairs events, Zhou En has come to say, “We are at the beginning of our diplomatic work on the united international front” (24). By promoting the important role played by the Communist Party of China in the war against Japan, Zhou Eun-yung removed the misunderstanding of the international community and created a positive image of the Communist Party of China at the international level. To point out that China is “the champion of the East against fascism” and that the world war against fascism “depends with China's resistance”.

Zhou En has focused on theoretically illustrating the relationship between China ' s anti-Japanese war and the world ' s anti-fascist war and, on the basis of an ongoing analysis of the international political forces, has made an important contribution to the conceptual construction of China ' s relationship with the world anti-fascist united front. A proper analysis of the various international political forces and the identification of enemies, me and friends is a prerequisite for ascertaining whether and how the world united against fascism can be established. Zhou En has come to attach great importance to this. When Zhou En came to speak of internal resistance at the beginning of the nation-wide struggle, he was often linked to the international situation and analysed the positions, views and attitudes of States. In December 1937, Zhou Enlai, a report at the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University, in which he referred to the war situation, judged that Germany “proved that something was going to happen in the West”, that the British wavering “affected the Front for Peace, but not a group of aggressors”, that “the law was difficult, the beauty was slow and the Soviet Union was close”, and that he concluded that “the current international conditions were difficult for a period of time and the turmoil was developing”. (25) After the entire nation had entered the strategic phase of its struggle, he pointed out with blood and blood that Japan's international policy was “to isolate us in an international context, through which everything in the East passed” (26). To that end, he took great note of the anti-fascist attitude that had influenced the world ' s major Powers with China ' s resistance. In 1938, he published an article in the daily newspaper Xinhua, in which he stated that “as long as we persist in fighting, European and American democracies will not change their attitude completely” (27). Prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War, Zhou En came to call Mao Zedong to conduct an in-depth analysis of the situation in the Pacific and to recommend that work be done overseas on the international unity front, “for British and American people”. (28) Following the outbreak of the Pacific War, Zhou En came to the anti-fascist united front and proposed that “the United States and the United Kingdom should establish a common front with the Soviet Union” and that China should “unify the British and the American people to form an anti-fascist front in the Pacific”. (29) How did the forces of the anti-fascist front in the aftermath of the Second World War become known? At the end of 1944, Zhou En came to provide an in-depth analysis of the policies of the anti-fascist allies: “The British versus the East or Imperialism. It was maintaining the British Empire and was still trying to delineate its sphere of influence. The United States is not different in nature from Britain, but in approach.” The policy of the United States is to help Chiang Lai fight the day against Su-Ying." (30) It is by analysing the contrast of forces that Zhou En has always made a clear judgement of the changes in international relations, which has provided the basis for the Chinese Communist Party to manage and take advantage of all kinds of external relations and to play its part in the world war against fascism. In analysing the interrelationship between China's anti-Japanese war and the world's anti-fascist war, Zhou En has argued for the idea of placing the anti-Japanese war among the world's anti-fascist war camps, while stressing that China's anti-Japanese war as the “Eastern anti-fascist front” makes a significant contribution to the world's anti-fascist war. On the one hand, Zhou En has come to the point that it is impossible for China to “leave the world and stand alone” (31). After the war against Japan entered a strategic phase, Mao argued that “China is closely connected to the world, that the war against Japan is part of the world war and that China's victory against the war against Japan cannot leave the world and be isolated” (32). In response to Mao's call for “the world's attention” (33), Zhou En has come to terms with the fact that China's resistance has become more persistent and more capable of affecting the world. He noted that China ' s anti-Japanese war was consistent with the goals of the world ' s anti-fascist war. The Communist Party of China (CPC) will always maintain its anti-war objective of “eliminating fascist forces”. China's anti-Japanese war was “to expel Japan from China, and now more connected to the world's anti-fascist war”. (34) On the other hand, China has played an important role in the establishment and maintenance of the world anti-fascist united front. China “has long been an anti-fascist pioneer in the East” (35) because of its persistence in fighting, and since 1931, when China began a partial resistance, and when seven events changed in 1937, when it fought against all of its people, it opened the first large-scale anti-fascist war in the East. Zhou En realized earlier that the World Anti-Fascist Unity Front had been established as an alliance against fascist countries. This united front has no ideology, no geography or pattern of national development and is aimed at fighting fascism. In 1939, Zhou En came to present the idea of “World Wars” and considered Japan “preparation for World Wars”. (36) In 1940, Zhou En further recognized that the world could change significantly and that “we should deal with the world's changing situation” (37). How can we cope with such a big change? Zhou En has come to note that “the imperialist war is now on the path of expansion and durability” (38). After the Sudeten war, the Soviet Union and the Communist Party reaffirmed their position on the establishment of a world anti-fascist united front. The CCP has also issued a declaration that clearly states the slogan “Assisting the international front against fascism”. In response, Zhou En has stated that China's resistance “has long been on the front lines of anti-Fascist bandits in Japan” and that China, together with the countries of the world, will “work together to achieve the success of the anti-Fascist cause throughout the world”. (39) Before the outbreak of the Pacific war, Zhou Enlai published an article in the Xinhua daily newspaper, in which he clearly stated that “the world anti-fascist front will eventually form” (40) and that it is “a world-wide anti-fascist aggression front centred on China, the Sudan, the United Kingdom and the United States” (41). He argued that the world war against fascism was “a war that has survived” (42). At a time when the world's anti-fascist united front had formed, Zhou Enn had further emphasized the role of China. On 1 January 1942, in Washington, D.C., the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the Middle 26 countries issued the United States Joint Declaration, in which they resolved to fight the fascist aggression together, marking the official formation of a world united against fascism. In response, Zhou Enlai delivered a speech at the welcoming meeting when he returned to Janan, proposing that he should “see the rise and expansion of the world's struggle against fascism”. The anti-fascist war was transformed from a dangerous to a defeat, from a passive to a proactive one, “depending on China's resistance”. (43) Later, Zhou Enlai made it clear that China was “one of the main members of the international anti-fascist aggression front” (44) and that China “resolutely stood on the front lines of the war against East Methodism” (45). By analysing China's relations with the world, China's National Unity Front and the World Anti-Fascist Unity Front, Zhou Eun pointed out that while the world's anti-fascist wars have six main characteristics: long-term, unbalanced, comprehensive, consistent, phased and dependent, “the flood of justice” will, on the one hand, lead to the formation of the anti-fascist unity front and, on the other hand, show the world that victory must be just. (46) Zhou En ' s presentation of the anti-fascist war view reflects the international view of the Communist Party of China, defines the justice of the world ' s anti-fascist war, sets the right value for the world ' s anti-fascist struggle and points the way for relations between China and the world ' s anti-fascist united front. III. CONCLUDING that “best use should be made of the assistance of friends” and international cooperation

On the issue of seeking assistance, the National Party considers international assistance to be the main force driving China to persist in its fight against war, and therefore pins its victory on the changes in the international situation and the increase in international aid. Zhou Enlai, having reached out to a wide range of people in various countries, offered a more comprehensive view of international assistance. He pointed out that the international community could not simply be expected to assist China in the anti-Japanese war, but rather to see that China ' s resistance certainly required assistance from the world and that China ' s resistance was an important aspect of international cooperation in the fight against fascism. At the beginning of the nation-wide struggle, Zhou En came acutely aware that in the past we had not made the best use of “the advantages that exist and develop in the international environment”. In response, he suggested that we should “best use our friends' assistance”. In January 1938, Zhou En came to talk about China ' s insistence on the conditions of a lasting resistance, making international assistance one of the conditions, and pointed out that it would be a loss to China ' s fight against it if it were not clear to the international community what happened in the previous period. To that end, he called for the expansion of international advocacy and for “material and even technical assistance for all peace-loving people” (47), that is, “to make good use of international advantages” (48). He suggested that the whole party should “enhanced international activity”, “enlarge the front” and strengthen international integration as long as “the same principles and interests”. (49) In practice, after the outbreak of the national resistance, Zhou En has used the close links maintained with the United Kingdom to obtain the acquiescence of the Hong Kong British authorities for the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) to carry out the day-to-day campaign in Hong Kong and the establishment of the 8th Road Force office in Hong Kong in January 1938. He has also secured substantial international supplies for the Communist Party of China through the Alliance for the Defence of China, led by Song Qinggi and others. At the same time, Zhou En has sought some medical supplies and financial assistance for the Communist Party of China from international groups such as the United States of America, United China, the Friends Corps and the British Red Cross. On the eve of the Sudeten war, the Chinese war against Japan had entered its fourth year. On the one hand, the Nationalist Army is retreating from the front, and on the other hand, the Chinese people will have long struggles to win the war. On the other hand, the tension between Japan and the United States is rising in the Pacific. In response to complex war situations, Zhou En has published The Current War scene, which shows that, while Japan and the United States are exacerbating tensions, the United Kingdom and the United States will compromise with Japan at any cost in order to deal with Germany first. There can be no war between Japan and the United States in recent days. Our policy is “to use foreign aid, as appropriate, to destabilize Japan between China and the South” (50). He called for “we must strive to unite the anti-fascist front of the peoples of the world” (51) in order to isolate Japanese imperialism and fight the fascist forces of the world. On this basis, “we do not reject foreign aid in our independent and national liberation position and seek foreign aid”, “and we do not reject the use of the contradictions between imperialism, especially the rivalries and possible conflicts between the United States and Japan”. (52) During this period, Zhou Enlai actively promoted the formation and development of the world anti-fascist united front and has done much to strengthen cooperation and exchanges between China and the world ' s anti-fascist countries. He has published more than a dozen reviews in the daily newspaper Xinhua, analysing the international situation and keeping an eye on the current situation with diplomats from the United States, the United Kingdom and the United States. In the post-war period, Zhou En has made international cooperation one of the priorities of external work. Zhou Enlai, as the highest leader of the Central Delegation of the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) in the country, obtained reliable information prior to the outbreak of the Sudeten war through frequent contacts with diplomats and journalists, and informed the Soviet Union in a timely manner through the CPC Central Centre. Before the outbreak of the Pacific war, Zhou Enlai strategically stated that Japan would take great adventures, and he wrote in Xinhua Daily that there was a possibility of war between Japan and the United States. To that end, he suggested that “the Pacific crisis would bring together East and West anti-Fascist Front justice, and States should be more united. Win or lose.” (53) He informed the British and American ambassadors in China first after the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor that the Chinese Communist Party would fight alongside them. He also published a post on the fifth day after Pearl Harbor, Pacific War and World War Bureau, which foresees an initial setback in the Pacific battlefield, but “winning must be justice” (54). From moral support and material assistance for the Chinese people in the fight against the Japanese war to a more in-depth explanation that only international cooperation in the fight against fascism can achieve justice over power, anti-aggression over aggression, and light over evil, Zhou En has once again looked at the significance of the war against Japan for the world ' s anti-fascist war in the light of the world ' s eyes, and has broadened the one-way perception of the National Party ' s reliance solely on international assistance to a two-way vision of broad international cooperation, indicating the right direction for China ' s advancement in the world ' s anti-fascist war, and providing more practical experience in promoting international cooperation on the anti-fascist reunification front. Emphasizing that, after the end of the world war against fascism, China should “responsiblely stand up in the world” and “responsible for the civilized world”,

Can China share the success of the world war against fascism? Zhou En has been thinking about this since the Sudeten War. In the aftermath of the First World War, instead of recovering Germany's privileges in Shandong, China was forced by Japan to sign in Paris and at the Conference to accept Japan's privileges in Shandong. As a result, the PTP broke out. Zhou Eun-Chou went through the campaign and grew up a professional revolutionary in the process. That is why Zhou Eun came earlier to reflect on whether China could share the victory of the anti-fascist war with other victors after the Second World War. As early as 1941, Zhou En ' s proposal was that, after the end of the world war against fascism, China should “strength in the world” (55) and that China “responsible for the civilized world” (56). In 1944, he further recognized that the victory of the world's anti-fascist war would be the “key to victory and failure” of China and the “change of its destiny”. (57) In April 1945, when the victory of the world ' s anti-fascist war was within reach, Zhou En has come to propose once again that it must be a complete victory, “only by a complete victory can China be truly independent and its nation completely liberated” (58). What is a complete victory? It is the full independence of sovereignty and the sharing of victory. These visions from Zhou En have closely linked China ' s relations with the world, the victory in the world ' s anti-fascist war and the revival of the Chinese nation. At a time when the world war against fascism was about to triumph, States had begun to prepare for the establishment of a new international organization, the United Nations. The Yalta Conference, held in early 1945, decided that China, as one of the initiators of the United Nations, would send a delegation to the United Nations Constituent Assembly in San Francisco. However, in order to enjoy the victory, the National Party attempted to exclude the Communist Party of China from United Nations meetings. In order to secure United Nations representation in the liberated areas, the Chinese delegation decided to send representatives to the San Francisco Conference at its six seventh plenary session. To this end, Zhou Enlai, in ongoing consultations with the National Party, the United States Embassy in China and others, stated in a clear manner that the Chinese delegation at the United Nations Conference “should never be represented by a representative of the Government of the National Party alone” and that the National Party could not “work in one hand”. (59) Following a number of interventions, United States President Roosevelt clearly informed Chiang Kai-shek that the Chinese delegation should be represented by other parties. As a result of the efforts of the Central and Southern Bureaux of the Chinese Communist Party, the National Party authorities allowed the Communist Party to send a member of the Chinese delegation. Tung Bingwu attended as a representative of the Liberation Zone in San Francisco, United States. To that end, the Bureau of the PRC's seven-year-old Plenum Bureau stated that the main task of Dong Bing-Wu's visit to the United States was to gain foreign friends and to raise the international standing of the Chinese Communist Party. On 25 April 1945, the United Nations Constituent Assembly was held in San Francisco and Tung Bingwu solemnly signed the Charter of the United Nations on behalf of the liberated areas of China. The Chinese Communist Party participated in the United Nations Constituent Assembly, defending its own legitimate rights and interests, defending the Chinese people ' s victory in the world ' s anti-fascist war, breaking the National Party ' s diplomatic monopoly. It was the first time that the Chinese Communist Party formally participated in international multilateral affairs. It carried out positive propaganda on the international image of the Chinese Communist Party. It had a profound impact on the Chinese Communist Party ' s participation in the post-war re-establishment of the international order. Following the convening of the United Nations Constituent Assembly, the world's war against fascism entered the final stage of victory. In August 1945, during the last war on Japanese imperialism, Zhou En came to draft the CCP's Declaration on the current situation and further proposed that “the liberated areas of China be allowed to elect representatives to participate in future peace conferences and United Nations meetings dealing with Japan” (60). The preservation of the victory of the world ' s anti-fascist war is both Zhou Eun ' s in-depth reflection on post-war international relations, as well as the Chinese Communist Party ' s active participation in the re-establishment of international relations after the war. During the All-China War against Japan, Zhou Eun explored the relationship between China ' s anti-Japanese war and the world ' s anti-fascist war in theory. The early idea of placing the anti-Japanese war among the world ' s anti-fascist war camps gave a strong impetus to the victory over the war against Japan and the world ' s anti-fascist war. Zhou Enlai ' s discourse and practice on the image-formulation of the Chinese Communist Party in the world ' s anti-fascist war, the establishment of the anti-fascist united front and international cooperation, and the preservation of the victory of the anti-fascist war have greatly enriched the theory and practice of international dissemination by the Chinese Communist Party, reflecting the position of the Chinese Communist Party in the world; it has also greatly enriched the theoretical understanding of the world ' s anti-fascist united front; it has contributed to the formation and maintenance of the world ' s anti-fascist united front; and it has made an important contribution to the Chinese people ' s struggle against the Japanese war and to the final victory of the world ' s anti-fascist war. Notes:

1 The Committee of Revolutionary Soldiers of the Twenty-sixth Road Army paid tribute to the National Brothers of Soldiers (22 December 1931), 8th Book of Selected Key Documents Since the Establishment of the Party, Central Documents Press 2011, 785 pp. 2 [United States] Edgar Snow: " The West Lodge " , Tung Looshan translation, Life Reader, Xinjiang Bookshop, 1979 edition, p. 1. 3 Zhou Eun-eun (I), Central Documentation Press, 2008, pp. 343, 344. 4 Chourne Pass (II), Central Documentation Press, 2008, p. 463. Central Instructions for the Unification of Inland and External Advocacy on the Basis of 25 May 1941, 18th Book of Selected Important Documents Since the Establishment of the Party, Central Documentation Press 2011, 305 pp. 6 Zhou Enlai: How to Endeavour the War? (7 January 1938), vol. 2 Zhou Enlai Military Text, People’s Press 1997, p. 87. 7 Zhou Enlai: Cultural Work and Movement in Resistance (9 August 1940), Zhou Enlai Cultural Selected, Central Documentation Press, 1998, p. 21. 8 Zhou Enlai: Strategy, Methodology and Code on the Unified Front 4 August 1939, Zhou Enlai Unity Front Biography, People's Press 1984 edition, p. 43. Nine weeks ago: " The current situation and the mandate of the four new forces " . March 1939, Zhou En's Selected, volume, People's Press 1980, p. 102. 10 Zhou Ning Year Book (1898-1949) (Revised), Central Documentation Press, 2020 edition, p. 573. (11) Money Light: Reminiscent of the Battle Years in the Chongqing Office of the Eighteenth Army, CCP History Paper No. 2 of 1985. (12) The History Unit of the Party of the Guangxi Autonomous Region Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCP), “The work of the Unified Front of the Southern Central Bureau of the Communist Party of China (CCP), 2009 edition, p. 305. (13) CCP Chongqing Party History Study Office, History of the Central South Bureau of CCP, 2009 edition, p. 305. (14) See Wu Swe, Wang Yongchin, “Diplomatic thought and practice before Zhou Enlai's nation-building”, Dissertation Series of Zhou Enlai Research Colloquium, Central Documentation Press 1988, p. 307. (15) [U.S.] Baishud: Exploring History — China's War Against Japan written by Baishud, Ma Ching Chong Chong Chong, Fan Jian, Life Reader, Xinjiang Bookshop, 1987, p. 69. (16) See [D] Wang Anna: China — My Second Home, LEE Li Li Yang Jian and Li Xi Xian, Translation, Life Reader and Xinjiang Bookshop 1980, p. 361. (17) See Curie Focus on the Republic of Cyprus, New China newspaper, 9 March 1941. (18) CCP Directive on the Pacific Anti-Japanese Unified Front, 13 December 1941, Emancipation Daily. (19) Chou Enlai, Pacific War and World War Bureau, Xinhua Daily, 14 December 1941. (20) The Zhou Nun Era (1898-1949) (Revised), pp. 557-558. (21) Welcome to the U.S. Military Observer Group!, Liberation Daily, 15 August 1944. (22) Yang Sang-kun: Yang Sang-kun Memories, Central Documents Press, 2001, p. 224. (23) Wudo: I'm back from Shao Kit, 1 November 1944, Xinhua Daily. (24) Directive of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the Diplomatic Service (18 August 1944), 21st Book of Selected Key Documents since the Establishment of the Party, Central Documentation Press 2011, 473 pp. (25) Zhou Enlai: The current state of war and the maintenance of a long-term military approach to combat (December 1937), Zhou Enlai Military Selected, vol. 2, p. 76. (26) Zhou Enlai: Outline of the report on the political and strategic aspects of the war in China and Japan 18-19 April 1939, Zhou Enlai, vol. 2, p. 198. (27) Zhou Enlai: On the current situation of the resistance (7-9 October 1938), vol. 2, p. 160. (28) Zhou Enlai: Analysis of the situation in the Pacific and our response 3 July 1941, Chou Enlai Military Selected, vol. 2, p. 347. (29) Zhou Enlai: The Sood War and the Fight against Fascism (29 June 1941), Zhou Enlai Military Selected, vol. 2, pp. 341, 343. (30) Wu Swe-Chang, Wang Yongchin: " Diplomatic thought and practice before Zhou Enlai ' s nation-building " , Dissertation Series of Zhou Eun-Chou ' s Study Colloquium, p. 310. (31) Zhou Eunlai: The “918” Decade, Xinhua Daily, 18 September 1941. (32) Mao Zedong: On a new stage — a new stage in the development of the national war against Japan and the national unity front against Japan (see para. 12-14 October 1938, 15th Book of Selected Highlights since the Establishment of the Party, Central Documents Press 2011, p. 633. (33) Mao Zedong: Relying on Self-Reliance without Relaxing Foreign Aid (October 1938), Mau Zedong Foreign Policy Selected, Central Documentation Press, World Knowledge Press, 1994, p. 15. (34) Zhou Enlai: United against the enemy (20 July 1941), Chou Enlai Military Selected, vol. 2, p. 363. (35) Zhou Enlai: United against the enemy (20 July 1941), Chou Enlai Military Selected, vol. 2, p. 363. (36) Zhou Enlai: Keys to the Current Situation (4 August 1939), Chou Enlai Military Selected, vol. 2, p. 242. (37) Zhou Enlai: The International Situation and China's Resistance (29 September 1940), Zhou Enlai Military Selected, vol. 2, p. 271. (38) Zhou Enlai: On the current situation (25 May 1941), Chou Enlai Military Selected, vol. 2, p. 314. (39) Zhou Enlai: The War on Sud and the Fight against Fascism (29 June 1941), Zhou Enlai Military Selected, vol. 2, p. 337. (40) Zhou Enlai: Four years “seventeen” (7 July 1941), vol. 2, p. 353. (41) Zhou Enlai: United against the enemy (20 July 1941), Chou Enlai Military Selected, vol. 2, p. 363. (42) Zhou Enlai: Pacific War and World War Bureau, Xinhua Daily, 14 December 1941. (43) Zhou Enlai: Address at the Janan Welcoming Conference (2 August 1943), Zhou Enlais, p. 133, 134. (44) Zhou Enlai: United against the enemy (20 July 1941), Chou Enlai Military Selected, vol. 2, p. 363. (45) Zhou Enlai: “seventeen years” (7 July 1941), vol. 2, p. 354. (46) Zhou Enlai: Pacific War and World War Bureau, Xinhua Daily, 14 December 1941. (47) Zhou Enlai: How to Endeavour the Resistance? (7 January 1938), Zhou Enlai, vol. 2, p. 87. (48) Chou Enlai and his career, Chinese Communist Party, History Press, 1990, p. 222. (49) Zhou Enlai: Outline of the report on the political and strategic aspects of the war in China and Japan (S/AC.44/1999/CRP.14) 18-19 April 1939, Zhou Enlai Military Selected, vol. 2, p. 205. (50) Zhou Enlai: On the current battle, Xinhua Daily, 25 May 1941. (51) Zhou Enlai: Four years “seventeen years” (7 July 1941), Zhou Enlai Military Selected, vol. 2, p. 357. (52) Zhou Enlai: " The primacy of nation and state " , Xinhua Daily, 15 June 1941. (53) Zhou Enlai: The New Crisis in the Pacific, Xinhua Daily, 19 October 1941. (54) Zhou Enlai: Pacific War and World War Bureau, Xinhua Daily, 14 December 1941. (55) Zhou Enlai: United against the enemy (20 July 1941), Chou Enlai Military Selected, vol. 2, p. 364. (56) Zhou Enlai: The New Crisis in the Pacific, Xinhua Daily, 19 October 1941. (57) Zhou Enlai: How to resolve it, 12 October 1944, Le Libération daily. (58) Zhou Enlai: Development of the People ' s War, commitment to complete victory and rejection of compromise peace April 1945, Zhou Enlai Military Selected, vol. 2, p. 519. (59) Zhou Enlai: "Assisting against the one-party arrangement of the National Party - to Wang Shigei" 7 March 1945, Zhou Eun-Chou, 1988 edition, p. 261. (60) Zhou Enlai: Current Urgent Request (August 1945), Zhou Enlai Military Selected, vol. 2, p. 545.